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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the United States Supreme Court observed nearly twenty
years ago that "news gathering is not without its First Amendment pro-
tections,"' the Court has been loathe to interpret the Constitution in a
way that provides the press with special rights.2 Journalists may serve as
representatives of the citizenry,3 but they are entitled to no greater access
to government information4 and facilities5 than other members of the
public. Despite this denial of preferred status in gathering news, 6 report-
ers are professionally obligated to provide readers, listeners and viewers
with "full access to the day's intelligence."7 To gather this information,
they have found it necessary to promise anonymity to sources8 and have
sought judicial recognition of a right to make, and keep, these
agreements. 9
1. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972). The First Amendment provides:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of grievances." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
2. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-22, at 976 (2d ed.
1988).
3. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. y. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1980).
4. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974).
5. See Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978).
6. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 834; Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684-85. Former Supreme Court
Justice Potter Stewart urged the recognition of a preferred status for journalists, Potter Stew-
art, "Or of the Press", 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634-35 (1975), but Professor Laurence Tribe
considers that position unnecessary because the First Amendment requires government to jus-
tify any interference with information gathering, TRIBE, supra note 2, at 944 n.5. For discus-
sions regarding whether the First Amendment provides protection to the institutional press
beyond that provided by the Free Speech Clause, see C. Edwin Baker, Press Rights and Gov-
ernment Power to Structure the Press, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 819 (1980) (advocating special
"defensive" protection under Free Press Clause), and Anthony Lewis, A Preferred Position for
Journalism?, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 595 (1979) (opposing special constitutional status for news
media).
7. WILLIAM L. RIVERS ET AL., RESPONSIBILITY IN MASS COMMUNICATION 48 (3d ed.
1980). The crucial function of the news media in American democracy has been recognized by
the United States Supreme Court: "Without the information provided by the press most of us
and many of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on
the administration of government generally." Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
492 (1975).
8. See infra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
9. REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES & IN-
FORMATION 2 (1990) [hereinafter CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES].
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All but a handful of states, by statute 0 or under common law,11 and
an overwhelming majority of federal courts12 have recognized an eviden-
10. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1986); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150-.220 (1983 & Supp.
1990); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2214, 12-2237 (1982 & Supp. 1990); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-85-510 (Michie 1987); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1966 & Supp. 1991); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 13-90-119, 24-72.5-101 to 106 (Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326
(1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (Michie 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 8-901 to 8-
909 (Smith-Hurd 1984 & Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Bums 1986); KY. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-1459
(West 1982 & Supp. 1991); MD. CrS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1989); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.945(1) (Callaghan Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.023-.025 (West 1988);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to -903 (1989); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147 (1987);
NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49.275 (Michie 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to -21.8,
2A:84A-29 (West 1976 & Supp. 1991); N.M. Sup. CT. R. 11-514 (1986); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS
LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, 2739.12 (Anderson 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506
(West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1988); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (1982);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to 9-19.1-3 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (Supp. 1990).
11. A constitutional or common law qualified privilege for newsgatherers has been recog-
nized by courts in Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, New Hamp-
shire, North Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
See Connecticut Labor Relations Bd. v. Fagin, 370 A.2d 1095, 1097-99 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1976); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Morejon, 561 So. 2d 577, 579-80 (Fla. 1990); In re
Wright, 700 P.2d 40, 44-45 (Idaho 1985); Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847, 850 (Iowa
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978); State v. Sandstrom, 581 P.2d 812, 814 (Kan. 1978),
cert denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979); In re Letellier, 578 A.2d 722, 726 (Me. 1990); Mississippi v.
Harden, Crim. No. 3858 (Miss. Cir. Ct. of Yalobusha County Mar. 23, 1983); Opinion of the
Justices, 373 A.2d 644, 647 (N.H. 1977); State v. Smith, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1940, 1941-
42 (N.C. Super. Ct. 1987); Dallas Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Mouer, 533 S.W.2d 70, 77 (Tex. Civ. App.
1976); State v. St. Peter, 315 A.2d 254, 256 (Vt. 1974); Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d
429, 431 (Va.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974); Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 641 P.2d
1180, 1183-84 (Wash. 1982); State ex reL Hudok v. Henry, 389 S.E.2d 188, 192-93 (W. Va.
1989); State ex rel Green Bay Newspapers Co. v. Circuit Court, 335 N.W.2d 367, 371-72
(Wis. 1983).
12. A qualified First Amendment privilege for newsgatherers has been recognized by
courts in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth and the District of Columbia
Circuits. See LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 818 (1986); McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Arizona (In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust
Litig.), 680 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d
705, 713-14 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583,
597-98 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Cthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980), cert
denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 437
(10th Cir. 1977); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 993 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1125 (1973).
The Sixth Circuit has rejected the privilege. Storer Communications, Inc. v. Giovan (In
re Grand Jury Proceedings), 810 F.2d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 1987). The Eleventh Circuit has not
addressed the privilege, but it is bound by Fifth Circuit precedent. Bonner v. City of Pritch-
ard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981). The Seventh Circuit has not addressed the issue,
but at least four district courts have recognized the privilege. United States v. Bingham, 765
F. Supp. 954, 956 (N.D. Ill. 1991); May v. Collins, 122 F.R.D. 535, 540 (S.D. Ind. 1988);
United States v. Lopez, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2203, 2205 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Gulliver's Peri-
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tiary privilege that allows newsgatherers to refuse to testify or disclose
their work product. The scope and application of this privilege varies
greatly among the states and federal circuits, however. 3
A multiplicity of rules within jurisdictions further complicates the
matter. The federal courts have developed a qualified 4 privilege in
which courts engage in a case-by-case balancing of competing interests, 15
weighing a litigant's need for the evidence against the impact disclosure
might have on the First Amendment interest in maintaining a "vigorous,
aggressive and independent press."16 In California, the courts have ap-
plied both a qualified First Amendment privilege17 and a state constitu-
tional and statutory immunity from contempt.1 8 This state immunity,
known as a "shield law," is absolute on its face.19 Yet it is inapplicable
when the journalist is a party to the litigation,20 and it is qualified when
the party seeking disclosure is a criminal defendant.2"
Journalists contend that they need a testimonial privilege in order to
keep their promises of confidentiality to sources who fear retribution or
other negative consequences if they are identified.22 Absent assurance
that they never will be identified and put in harm's way, these sources
will not provide the information, and the flow of information will be de-
odicals, Ltd. v. Chas. Levy Circulating Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197, 1202 (N.D. 111. 1978). Courts
in the Ninth Circuit are in conflict. See infra note 495.
13. See infra notes 117-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the varying interpre-
tations of the privilege in the federal courts and infra notes 191-389 and accompanying text for
a discussion of testimonial protections for journalists in California. For a summary of the
provisions of the 28 state shield laws and the holdings of state courts interpreting the statutes
or recognizing a newsgathering privilege under common law, see CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES,
supra note 9, at 4-12; James C. Goodale & Joseph P. Moodhe, Reporter's Privilege Cases, in 1
COMMUNICATIONS LAW 1990, at 297, 652-716 (Practicing Law Inst. 1990).
14. A privilege protects persons within a protected relationship from compelled disclosure
of their communications. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1078 (5th ed. 1979). A qualified, or
conditional, privilege is one in which the party seeking the protected information might over-
come the privilege by showing that the interests underlying the privilege are outweighed by the
need for disclosure. Duane D. Morse & John W. Zucker, The Journalist's Privilege, in TESTI-
MONIAL PRIVILEGES 407, 409 (Scott N. Stone & Ronald S. Liebman eds., 1983).
15. See infra notes 117-34 and accompanying text.
16. United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983).
17. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 274, 690 P.2d 625, 628, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152,
155 (1984).
18. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070; see infra notes 191-389 and
accompanying text.
19. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070.
20. Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 274, 690 P.2d at 628, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
21. Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 805-06, 789 P.2d 934, 946, 268 Cal. Rptr.
753, 765 (1990).
22. See infra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
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creased. 23 Any privilege's value is in its dependability; if it can be abro-
gated, it provides no real protection. 24 Without a reliable privilege, a
source can rely only on the journalist's fortitude in defying a judge who
demands disclosure.25
Journalists also argue that subpoenas are a serious intrusion into
their autonomy. 26 Litigants interfere with newsgathering by drawing off
press resources.27 Furthermore, reporters' independence and reputation
for objectivity are threatened both by their use as investigators in an ad-
versarial setting and by public exposure of their work product-includ-
ing material gathered without a promise of confidentiality.
28
This Comment reviews the practice among newsgatherers of pro-
tecting both the anonymity of their sources and the undisseminated in-
formation collected in the course of their duties. It traces (1) the
development of a First Amendment-based testimonial privilege in the
federal courts, including the Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg v.
Hayes,29 and (2) the enactment of California constitutional and statutory
provisions immunizing reporters from contempt.
The Comment proceeds to discuss how California courts have ap-
plied the First Amendment privilege and state shield law in the contexts
of (1) civil actions in which the journalist is a party, (2) civil actions in
which the journalist is a nonparty witness, and (3) criminal proceedings.
This review culminates in a discussion of Delaney v. Superior Court,30 in
which the California Supreme Court adopted a broad interpretation of
the shield law's scope and crafted a balancing test for the shield law when
invoked by newsgatherers during criminal proceedings.
The Comment concludes by suggesting that the California courts'
patchwork approach in applying absolute and qualified testimonial pro-
tection for journalists runs afoul of the First Amendment's dual interests
in promoting the free flow of information to the public and maintaining
an autonomous press, particularly in light of the changing role of the
news media in America. The Comment recommends that the journalism
23. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
24. See Robert Weisberg, Note, Defendant v. Witness: Measuring Confrontation and
Compulsory Process Rights Against Statutory Communications Privileges, 30 STAN. L. REv.
935, 966 (1978).
25. See infra notes 57-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the journalist's ethical
duty to keep promises of confidentiality.
26. See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
29. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
30. 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990).
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profession develop and enforce strict ethical standards limiting the use of
confidential agreements. Further, the legislature should offer California
voters a state constitutional amendment that provides: (1) an absolute
testimonial privilege barring all types of sanctions for reporters who
withhold information under a promise of confidentiality; and (2) a uni-
formly enforced qualified privilege both for information sought by crimi-
nal defendants and defamation plaintiffs, and for undisseminated
information not gained under a promise of confidentiality.
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Traditional First Amendment analysis would forbid compelled dis-
closure of confidential news sources and information unless there is no
alternative less inhibiting to a free press.31 In Branzburg v. Hayes,32 the
United States Supreme Court declined to require such a showing before a
grand jury subpoena would be enforced against a journalist 33 because the
First Amendment interest in confidentiality could not override the com-
peting interest in pursuing and prosecuting crimes. 31 Other courts, view-
ing demands for evidence from journalists in different legal contexts,
have limited Branzburg's holding to its facts and have demanded such a
showing by litigants in both criminal and civil proceedings.3"
The mixed message of Branzburg and its progeny has been carried
into California jurisprudence as state courts have struggled to resolve
conflicts between press interests under the shield law36 and the rights of
litigants, particularly defamation plaintiffs37 and criminal defendants.
38
In contrast, in civil actions where the subpoenaed journalist is a nonparty
witness, litigants have been found to have no rights deserving of a weigh-
31. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-22, at 976. Under this reasoning, government action that is
largely indifferent to newsgathering, but operates as a deterrent to uninhibited newsgathering,
is an "undue hindrance." Id. § 12-19, at 944 n.5. Government must demonstrate that there is
no alternative that is less inhibiting to the press. Id. Typically, courts balance the extent to
which communication is inhibited against the values, interests, or rights served by the inhibi-
tion. Id. § 12-23, at 978-79.
32. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
33. See id. at 702-03.
34. Id. at 708; Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 859 (1974) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
35. See infra notes 117-34 and accompanying text.
36. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1991).
37. See Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 283-84, 690 P.2d 625, 635, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 152, 162 (1984); KSDO v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 384, 186 Cal. Rptr.
211, 216 (1982).
38. See Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 805-06, 789 P.2d 934, 946, 268 Cal.
Rptr. 753, 765 (1990); Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388,402, 153 Cal. Rptr.
608, 616 (1979).
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ing process, and compelled disclosure is forbidden.3 9
Where balancing tests have been applied, they have injected uncer-
tainty into the law. For example, until 1990, a journalist called to the
witness stand in a California criminal case could count on the judge to
require that any party seeking evidence show that the evidence was cru-
cial to the outcome of the case and was unavailable from other sources.4°
In Delaney v. Superior Court,41 however, the California Supreme Court
downgraded both of these elements to "factors" a judge might consider
in a case-by-case balancing test weighing a journalist's claim of privilege
against a criminal defendant's right to evidence.42 Neither element is
now required; disclosure may be compelled once a defendant convinces
the court there is a reasonable possibility the information would materi-
ally assist his or her defense.43
The crazy quilt of standards used in various procedural situations
has made the privilege increasingly unpredictable for California journal-
ists. Only an omniscient reporter could know prospectively when he or
she agrees to keep a secret whether, and in what kind of proceeding, he
or she will be subpoenaed. Whether a judge will respect a newsgatherer's
claim of privilege tends to hinge on four factors: (1) whether the litiga-
tion is governed by state or federal law; (2) whether the litigation is crim-
inal or civil; (3) whether the journalist or his or her employer are parties
to the litigation; and (4) what type of information is being sought.
This Comment attempts to assist litigants and newsgatherers in de-
termining where the lines are drawn and what level 6f protection is likely
to be accorded a journalist in each situation. The Comment also demon-
strates that the very existence of these categories and inconsistent balanc-
ing tests subvert the First Amendment's guarantee of a free press,
unhampered in gathering and disseminating information in a democratic
society.
39. See New York Times v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 453, 461-62, 796 P.2d 811, 816,
273 Cal. Rptr. 98, 103 (1990); Playboy Enters. v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 28, 201
Cal. Rptr. 207, 218 (1984).
40. See infra notes 191-208 and 232-79 and accompanying text for discussions of how
California courts applied these standards in libel and criminal proceedings and infra notes 117-
34 and accompanying text for a discussion of how federal courts applied these standards under
qualified First Amendment newsgathering privilege jurisprudence.
41. 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990).
42. Id. at 807-09, 789 P.2d at 947-49, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 766-68. For a discussion of these
factors, see infra notes 330-76 and accompanying text.
43. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 808-09, 789 P.2d at 948, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
November 1991]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:155
III. THE TRADITION OF PROTECTING NEWS SOURCES
Rather than simply serving as a forum for debate,' the news media
in the United States have adopted a watchdog role in which they seek to
independently scrutinize all forces of power in society, including the offi-
cial power of government.4" While a majority of Americans does not
know that the First Amendment guarantees freedom of the press,46 poll-
sters have found enthusiastic support for "watchdoggery"-four out of
every five people believe press scrutiny keeps leaders from engaging in
wrongdoing.4 7
This activist role has placed aggressive reporters and editors into an
adversarial relationship with government,4" the business establishment
and interest groups that wield political, social and economic influence.49
To obtain information about the conduct of these public and private
"powers," reporters must rely on employees and others who might be
fired, suffer harrassment, lose business, or even be injured or killed by
those displeased by their disclosures.5 0 A vulnerable source typically de-
44. A constitutionally protected "marketplace of ideas" was advocated by Justice Holmes
in Abrams v. United States: "[Tihe ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas ... T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market." 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
45. AMERICAN SOC'Y OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, art. I
(1975), reprinted in JOHN L. HULTENG, PLAYING IT STRAIGHT 85 (1981).
46. THE TIMES MIRROR Co., THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS 18 (1986). This report contains
the results of a survey by The Gallup Organization during the summer and fall of 1985, in
what was described as the largest, most fully integrated analysis ever conducted regarding
Americans' opinions about the news media. Id. at 3.
47. Id. at 10-11, 41.
48. Vince Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229,
234-35 (1971). Perhaps the most dramatic confrontation between government and the press
occurred when the Justice Department obtained an injunction restraining The New York
Times from continuing to publish the "Pentagon Papers," a classified Department of Defense
report on the United States' entry into the Vietnam War. The United States Supreme Court
dissolved the order with a brief per curiam opinion. New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713 (1971). In his concurring opinion, Justice Black found support in the United
States Constitution for the activist, watchdog role of the press:
In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection
it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve the
governed, not the governors. The Government's power to censor the press was abol-
ished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The
press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the
people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in gov-
ernment. And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to
prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off
to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell.
Id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring).
49. See JOHN L. HULTENG, PLAYING IT STRAIGHT 11-12 (1981).
50. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693 (1972); DAVID SHAW, PRESS WATCH 58-
59 (1984); Gene Foreman, Confidential Sources: Testing Readers' Confidence, in BELIEVING
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mands anonymity or a promise that certain information will not be dis-
closed unless it is confirmed by other sources. 1
Although many in the profession believe journalists enter into confi-
dential relationships with news sources far too often, 2 the practice con-
tinues unabated. 3 Defenders of the practice contend that if they refuse
to promise anonymity to sources, they will be unable to gather informa-
THE NEWS 213, 216-17 (Poynter Institute Ethics Center ed., 1985); Carl C. Monk, Evidentiary
Privilege for Journalists' Sources: Theory and Statutory Protection, 51 Mo. L. REv. 1, 12-13
(1986).
51. SHAW, supra note 50, at 64-65.
52. See, eg., SHAw, supra note 50, at 52-85; Foreman, supra note 50, at 213-14; George
Blake, Rebuilding Credibility, QUILL, Apr. 1988, at 21, 21-22.
David Shaw, national media critic at the Los Angeles Times, concluded that granting
news sources anonymity "may be the most widely abused practice in contemporary journal-
ism." SHAW, supra note 50, at 59. Unnamed sources are permitted to use the press "to grind
axes, advance ambitions, attack rivals and mislead the public." Id. at 57. While agreements of
confidentiality often are necessary in investigative and foreign reporting, the practice is routine
in Washington, D.C. Id. at 62-63. Shaw found that while many newspapers have policies
restricting the use of unidentified sources, they tend to be unenforced. Id. at 74-75.
Gene Foreman, managing editor of the Philadelphia Inquirer, argued that use of unnamed
sources hurts the general credibility of the news media. Foreman, supra note 50, at 213-14.
"By the very act of taking someone else into our confidence, we strain the confidence our
readers have in us.... There is skepticism, even cynicism, among our readers. We invite their
wrath when we keep secrets from them, when we tell them: 'Trust us.'" Id. at 214.
George Blake, editor of the Cincinnati Enquirer, chastised the news media for "rush[ing]
rumors, non-stories, and unattributed stories into print and onto the air as quickly as their best
reporting." Blake, supra, at 21. Calling on the news media to severely limit the use of anony-
mous sources, Blake has banned articles relying on unnamed sources from the Enquirer's front
page and will not publish them at all unless they are "very newsworthy." Id. at 22-23 (empha-
sis in original).
53. See Foreman, supra note 50, at 214. The prevalence of the practice was amply demon-
strated during the war with Iraq, during which the United States military provided reporters
with daily briefings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Only a small fraction of reporters were allowed
to participate in media pools that accompanied combat troops, leaving hundreds of other re-
porters to rely on the official briefings for information about the war. The allied commander,
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, regularly provided journalists with a non-televised "back-
ground session":
The idea was to reduce the formality and provide an easier atmosphere for give-and-
take, maybe taking a little of the edge off the daily military-press encounters.
There is no belief that the information is necessarily any better at these briefings,
but some think it gets closer to the bone on the best of days. Information from the
backgrounder can be easily spotted in the news because of its attribution to an anony-
mous "senior military official," a position that rotates among command-level officers.
[There] remains a gnawing doubt about a war in which so much of the hard
information passes through public relations specialists at controlled briefings before a
captive audience. How much is the military using its prerogative of secrecy for noth-
ing more than old-fashioned public relations?
John Balzar, Daily Military Briefings: A Mixture of Substance and Smoke, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
12, 1991, at A5.
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tion for stories important to the public,54 thereby diminishing the news
media's watchdog role. 5 As one prominent newspaper editor observed,
"We decide that the information is more important than the identity of
the provider." 6
That decision comes with risks. Once a promise of confidentiality is
made, a journalist has an ethical obligation to keep the promise, 7 regard-
54. The Watergate scandal is often cited as justification for the use of confidential sources.
See, e-g., Foreman, supra note 50, at 215; Monk, supra note 50, at 13. Washington Post report-
ers Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward determined that the White House was involved in the
burglary at Democratic headquarters with the help of an anonymous source in the executive
branch nicknamed "Deep Throat." They later dedicated their book about the scandal to
Nixon Administration members "who took risks to provide us with confidential information.
Without them there would have been no Watergate story told by the Washington Post." CARL
BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN 7 (1974).
Woodward told no one, including his editors, the true identity of Deep Throat. Id. at
236. Such total nondisclosure fell into disrepute in the profession in 1981 when it was discov-
ered that Washington Post reporter Janet Cooke had fabricated a Pulitzer Prize-winning story
about an eight-year-old drug addict named "Jimmy." Her editors (including Woodward, who
had become metropolitan editor) never required Cooke to tell them the boy's name, despite
skepticism among other Post staffers about Cooke's report that she had witnessed a drug dealer
inject the boy with heroin. STEPHEN KLAIDMAN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, THE VIRTUOUS
JOURNALIST 174-76 (1987). Reporters now are generally required to identify unnamed
sources to their editors. Monica Langley & Lee Levine, Broken Promises, COLUM. JOURNAL-
iSM REv., July-Aug. 1988, at 21, 22.
55. Foreman, supra note 50, at 216-17. In his dissent in Branzburg, Justice Stewart em-
phasized the chilling impact that follows from compelled disclosure of sources:
The right to gather news implies, in turn, a right to a confidential relationship
between a reporter and his source. This proposition follows as a matter of simple
logic once three factual predicates are recognized: (1) newsmen require informants
to gather news; (2) confidentiality-the promise or understanding that names or cer-
tain aspects of communications will be kept off the record-is essential to the crea-
tion and maintenance of a news-gathering relationship with informants; and (3) an
unbridled subpoena power-the absence of a constitutional right protecting, in any
way, a confidential relationship from compulsory process-will either deter sources
from divulging information or deter reporters from gathering and publishing
information.
408 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
56. Foreman, supra note 50, at 216-17.
57. No one code of ethics is binding on journalists in the United States, and many large
news organizations have their own policies. The American Society of Newspaper Editors has
adopted a Statement of Principles that provides, in pertinent part: "Pledges of confidentiality
to news sources must be honored at all costs, and therefore should not be given lightly. Unless
there is a clear and pressing need to maintain confidences, sources of information should be
identified." AMERICAN Soc'Y OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra
note 45, art. VI (emphasis added).
Similar provisions are found in the SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, SIGMA
DELTA CHI CODE OF ETHICS (1973), reprinted in HULTENG, supra note 49, at 83; Associ-
ATED PRESS MANAGING EDITORS CODE OF ETHICS (1975), reprinted in HULTENrG, supra
note 49, at 77. For a news organization policy statement, see Washington Post, Standards and
Ethics (1977), reprinted in RIVERS ET AL., supra note 7, at 297.
Some newspapers have begun qualifying their promises to sources. For example, the Or-
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less of the consequences.58 Large sums of money sometimes hang in the
ange County Register distinguishes between "anonymous sources," whom reporters promise
not to identify unless required by the courts, and "confidential sources," who will never be
identified. Confidentiality is to be granted only in the "rarest of cases," and only after approval
by the newspaper's top editors. Memorandum from N. Christian Anderson, Editor of the
Orange County Register, to News Division Associates (Sept. 27, 1988) (on file with author).
The Wall Street Journal has a similar policy, but it allows both reporters and editors to make
confidentiality agreements. Langley & Levine, supra note 54, at 23.
58. Whether, and how, journalists are legally and ethically bound to keep promises of
confidentiality has been the topic of much recent discussion among news professionals. The
controversy was sparked primarily by a lawsuit in which a source sued two newspapers who
identified him by name after their respective reporters agreed to keep him anonymous. Dan
Cohen, public relations director for an advertising agency hired by a candidate for Minnesota
governor, provided reporters for the Minneapolis Star and Tribune and the St. Paul Pioneer
Press Dispatch with information about a rival candidate's two arrests for shoplifting and un-
lawful assembly. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2516 (1991); Breach of Con-
tract Damages Affirmed, NEws MEDIA & THE LAW, Fall 1989, at 35. Although the reporters
had promised not to identify Cohen, their editors independently decided to name Cohen in
articles about the candidate's arrests because of Cohen's links to an opposition political cam-
paign. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2516; Langley & Levine, supra note 54, at 22-23. The decision set
off a "vigorous debate" in both newsrooms; the reporters objected unsuccessfully and one de-
manded that her byline be removed from the story. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d
199, 201 (Minn. 1990). Cohen was fired the day the articles appeared. Id. at 202.
Cohen sued the newspapers for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract, and
a jury awarded him $200,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages.
Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2516. The Minnesota Court of Appeals decided Cohen had not proven
the fraud claim, and reversed the punitive damage award. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445
N.W.2d 248, 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). The Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently struck
the compensatory damages, finding that an agreement of confidentiality was not an enforceable
contract, but rather "an 'I'll-scratch-your-back-if-you'll-scratch-mine' accommodation."
Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 203. "The parties understand that a reporter's promise of anonymity is
given as a moral commitment, but a moral obligation alone will not support a ontract ....
Each party, we think, assumes the risks of what might happen, protected only by the good
faith of the other party." Id.
The Minnesota Supreme Court went on to discuss whether Cohen should recover dam-
ages under promissory estoppel doctrine, which makes an otherwise nonbinding promise en-
forceable if the promise was reasonably expected to induce action by the promisee, the promise
induced such action, and injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise. Id. at 203-
04. The court held that promissory estoppel was inappropriate under the circumstances be-
cause the First Amendment interest in public debate, in which the promise of anonymity arose,
outweighed the state's common law interest in enforcing the promise through estoppel. Id. at
205.
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2516. Since "generally
applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment," and because promissory estoppel "does
not target or single out the press," the doctrine could be used to enforce an agreement of
confidentiality. Id. at 2518. The Court remanded the case to the Minnesota Supreme Court to
determine whether promissory estoppel was an appropriate claim under state law. Id. at 2520.
Disagreement over whether promises to sources are ethically binding arose when Bob
Woodward revealed in a book after the death of CIA Director William Casey that Casey was
one of his confidential sources. Langley & Levine, supra note 54, at 21. Woodward justified
the disclosure by stating, "Death is the final release from the agreement." Id. at 22. Other
circumstances justifying disclosure of confidential sources arise when a source providing infor-
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balance; if a news organization is sued for defamation after relying on
anonymous sources, it might be ordered by the court to disclose the
sources to the plaintiff.59 If the organization refuses to name the sources,
the court could enter a default judgment against the defendant," forbid
the organization from using the confidential source in its defense,61 or
instruct the jury to assume that the sources do not exist.6 Failure to
offer evidence that the news organization used reliable sources could jus-
tify damages for publishing a false statement of fact with actual malice.6
For uncooperative reporters not subject to civil penalties, the courts
favor imprisonment. Subpoenaed as a witness by the prosecution or de-
fendant in a criminal case, or by the litigants in a civil suit in which the
journalist is not a party, the reporter might be cited for contempt and
mation about a crime is involved in the crime, and when "a source gives you bad information,"
according to Woodward. Id. Newsweek identified Lt. Col. Oliver North as one of the news
magazine's sources after North complained to Congress that leaks to the media "very seriously
compromised our intelligence activities." Id. at 21. The Washington Post reported that the
Rev. Jesse Jackson had called Jews "Hymies" and New York City "Hymietown," even though
the remarks were made at a "not-for-attribution" breakfast meeting with two reporters. Dan
Oberdorfer, Is 'Burning a Source'a Breach of Contract?, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 1, 1988, at 8. A
number of news organizations now view a promise of confidentiality to be an agreement that
can only be made by the organization, and the organization-not the reporter-decides
whether to keep the agreement. See id. at 23-24; Richard P. Cunningham, Should Reporters
Reveal Sources to Editors?, QuiLL, Oct. 1988, at 6, 6-8.
All this provides ammunition to those who contend that journalists do not deserve a
testimonial privilege, since some reporters and employers pick and choose when they will be
bound by their promises. Media attorney David Bodney observed, "If reporters identify
sources-even if compelled by a judge or to bolster their own credibility-the press runs the
risk of hurting its argument that it needs confidentiality to preserve newsgathering." Langley
& Levine, supra note 54, at 24.
59. See, eg., Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 726-27 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 639 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dis.
missed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974); DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 507 F. Supp. 880, 887 (D. Haw. 1981).
60. See, eg., Georgia Communications Corp. v. Home, 294 S.E.2d 725, 726 (Ga. Ct. App.
1982).
61. See, eg., Laxalt v. McClatchy, 116 F.R.D. 438, 452-53 (D. Nev. 1987); Newton v.
National Broadcasting Co., 198 F.R.D. 522, 532 (D. Nev. 1985); Dalitz v. Penthouse Int'l,
Ltd., 168 Cal. App. 3d 468, 475, 214 Cal. Rptr. 254, 258 (1985).
62. See, eg., DeRoburt, 507 F. Supp. at 887; Downing v. Monitor Publishing Co., 415
A.2d 683, 686 (N.H. 1980).
63. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court held that a public
official cannot recover damages for defamation unless the false statement was made with "ac-
tual malice"-with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was
false or not. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The actual malice requirement was later extended
to public figures and private plaintiffs seeking presumed and punitive damages. Gertz v. Rob-
ert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346, 349 (1974). When a reporter refuses to identify the source
of information in an allegedly defamatory article or broadcast, a plaintiff can legitimately claim
that the information was fabricated, showing actual malice. See Carey, 492 F.2d at 636;
DeRoburt, 507 F. Supp. at 886; Blasi, supra note 48, at 232; Foreman, supra note 50, at 215-
16; Morse & Zucker, supra note 14, at 464.
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sentenced to jail for refusing to disclose evidence deemed relevant by the
court." Their practice of taking notes and photographs, their tendency
to seek out controversies, and their independence of the disputing parties
make journalists attractive and particularly credible witnesses.6"
The journalist's duty to protect confidential sources is not the only
grounds for resisting subpoenas. Reporters and editors object to disclo-
sure of notes, source documents, unbroadcast videotape and unreported
recollections because these materials and information are part of a news-
gathering process that must remain free from outside interference.66
They contend that opening their files and testifying for litigants in adver-
sarial proceedings will compromise their reputation for independence
and objectivity.67
The autonomy argument extends to the practical impact of answer-
ing subpoenas. Journalists must stop regular newsgathering efforts so
they can retrieve old notes and resource materials and attend court hear-
ings or depositions.68 This burden is greater for reporters than other citi-
zens because they regularly are sent to accidents, crime scenes and other
events likely to generate litigation 69 -making subpoenas frequent and
time-consuming.70
64. See infra note 72 for a discussion of recent reporter jailings; see also Foreman, supra
note 50, at 216; Paul Marcus, The Reporter's Privilege" An Analysis of the Common Law,
Branzburg v. Hayes, and Recent Statutory Developments, 25 ARiz. L. Rnv. 815, 816 (1983).
65. CONFIDENTIAL SouRcEs, supra note 9, at 2; RIVERS ET AL., supra note 7, at 200;
Morse & Zucker, supra note 14, at 408.
66. See Monk, supra note 50, at 15; Morse & Zucker, supra note 14, at 466.
67. Morse & Zucker, supra note 14, at 408.
68. Monk, supra note 50, at 52-53; Morse & Zucker, supra note 14, at 408. This argument
recently persuaded the New York Court of Appeals to recognize a newsgatherer's privilege
under the First Amendment and the state constitution that protects unpublished, nonconfiden-
tial information. O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 523 N.E.2d 277, 279-80 (N.Y. 1988). In
his concurring opinion, Justice Bellacosa observed: "The nature of the press function makes it
a more likely target for subpoenas which, in turn, will generate cost and diversion in time and
attention from journalistic pursuits.... Journalists should be spending their time in news-
rooms, not in courtrooms as participants in the litigation process." 523 N.E.2d at 283 (Bel-
lacosa, J., concurring); accord State ex reL Hudok v. Henry, 389 S.E.2d 188, 192 (W. Va.
1989).
69. United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (lst Cir. 1988); O'Neill,
523 N.E.2d at 729; Morse & Zucker, supra note 14, at 474; see also Opening Brief on the
Merits for Real Parties in Interest at 7, Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d
934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990) (No. S006866).
70. A survey of 1042 newspapers and television stations found that 46.7% had received
subpoenas in 1989, for a total of 4408 subpoenas. REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE
PREss, AGENTS OF DiscovERY 5 (1991). The study, by the Reporters Committee for Free-
dom of the Press, found that 54% of the subpoenas involved criminal cases and 34% of the
subpoenas involved civil proceedings. Id. at 7. Forty-six percent of the subpoenas sought
published or broadcast material; only 5% sought the names of confidential sources or informa-
tion gained under a promise of confidentiality. Id. at 12. Eight percent of the subpoenas were
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:155
When forced to choose between the orders of a court seeking every-
man's evidence and the ethical standards of their profession,71 a number
of reporters have elected jail.72 They have argued that the First Amend-
ment protects the process of newsgathering to the point where the courts
cannot require them to divulge the names of their sources73 and the raw
contested by the media in court; the remainder were complied with, were withdrawn, or the
disposition was unknown. Id. at 10. Of the challenged subpoenas, 76% were quashed by
judges because the information was available elsewhere (26%), the subpoenas were overbroad
(17%), the information was privileged under the United States Constitution (13%) or a state
shield law (16%), the information was not needed (14%) or irrelevant (13%), or other grounds
(1%). Id. at 11. Seven survey respondents said they each received more than 100 subpoenas
in 1989. Id. at 5.
Nineteen respondents said their reporting was affected by the subpoenas, and 17 respon-
dents said they were concerned about the financial strain from legal costs-with one mid-sized
Florida newspaper budgeting $8000 per month for attorney fees. Id. at 14. A small newspaper
in Massachusetts reported that it was receiving an increasing number of subpoenas for infor-
mation readily available from other sources. Id. An editor there observed: "It makes our job
harder because fewer people are willing to volunteer information to our reporters." Id.
News organizations in California said they received 594 subpoenas in 1989: 125 for the
print media and 469 for the broadcast media. Id. at 6. These figures probably are far lower
than the actual number of subpoenas, since the survey as a whole had a response rate of 49%
and two of California's three largest newspapers, the Los Angeles Times and the Orange
County Register, were not among the respondents. See id. at B1.
Of 975 journalists surveyed by Professor Blasi in 1971, 18.5% said they had been served
with subpoenas. Blasi, supra note 48, at 260.
71. One press commentator has observed: "Any citizen has an obligation to provide testi-
mony if such testimony is necessary to the administration ofjustice. But the journalist has the
additional obligation to defend freedom of the press .... Reconciling the two obligations is
often difficult and sometimes impossible." HuLTENO, supra note 49, at 18.
72. It is unclear how many reporters have spent time behind bars for withholding evi-
dence, but at least eight have been in custody since 1984. Telephone Interview with Gregg
Leslie, Legal Fellow with Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (July 17, 1991).
A recent example is the case of Brian Karem, a reporter for KMOL-TV in San Antonio,
Texas. A state court held Karem in contempt, sentenced him to six months in jail, and fined
him $500 for refusing to disclose the names of three people who, under promises of confidenti-
ality, helped Karem arrange an interview with a jail inmate accused of murdering a police
officer. Goodale & Moodhe, supra note 13, at 469-70. A federal district court denied Karem's
petition for habeas corpus, holding that no privilege was available under the First Amendment.
Karem v. Priest, 744 F. Supp. 136, 141 (W.D. Tex. 1990). The United States Supreme Court
refused to issue a stay while Karem appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Karem v. Priest, 110 S. Ct.
3309 (1990).
Karem spent two weeks in Bexar County Jail and was released only after the last of his
sources came forward. Goodale & Moodhe, supra note 13, at 471.
73. See, eg., McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Arizona (In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig.), 680
F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir.) (trade publication withheld names of confidential sources of oil pricing
information), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 710 (3d
Cir. 1979) (reporter refused to identify source of information from personnel file); Karem, 744
F. Supp. at 138 (reporter withheld notes containing names, addresses and telephone numbers
of confidential sources); Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 66, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342, 345
(1971) (reporter refused to name sources of document disclosed in violation of gag order), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
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material collected or created during their research,74 even if the informa-
tion was not gained under a promise of confidentiality."
Although American journalists have obeyed their duties of confiden-
tiality and independence for more than 250 years,76 these ethical obliga-
tions have not gained the same judicial respect accorded lawyers,
doctors, psychotherapists and the clergy.77 Judicial resistance to a uni-
formly enforced newsgatherer's privilege is especially striking in light of
the First Amendment policies that support protection for journalists.
IV. ROOTS OF THE PRIVILEGE
A. First Amendment Privilege Jurisprudence
1. Common law
While the practice of keeping secrets may be a "sacred tenet" of
journalism,7 common law refused to recognize reporters' claims of privi-
lege.79 Professor Wigmore declared that "[n]o pledge of privacy nor oath
of secrecy can avail against demand for truth in a court of justice," in-
cluding confidential communications to journalists.80 Courts are reluc-
tant to create new testimonial privileges because they obstruct the search
74. See, e.g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 142 (3d Cir. 1980) (nonconfiden-
tial television outtakes and notes), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981); Loadholtz v. Fields, 389
F. Supp. 1299, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (notes and recollections of interview with identified
source); O'Neill, 523 N.E.2d at 278 (unpublished photographs of traffic accident).
75. See, eg., Dillon v. City of San Francisco, 748 F. Supp. 722, 724 (N.D. Cal. 1990)
(television cameraman refused to testify about observations of alleged beating by police in
public); Hudok, 389 S.E.2d at 190 (radio reporter refused to testify about interview that had
not been broadcast).
76. Benjamin Franklin's half brother was jailed for a month in 1722 for refusing to tell the
legislature the name of an author who wrote an article in Franklin's newspaper. Marcus,
supra note 64, at 817. John Peter Zenger, the first American journalist to argue that truth was
a defense to charges of libel, defied the New York colonial governor in 1734 by refusing to
name the sources for his articles. MAURICE VAN GERPEN, PIUVILEGED COMMUNICATION
AND THE PREss 5-6 (1979).
77. See supra notes 78-103 and accompanying text. For a comparison of newsgatherer's
privilege and the privileges recognized under common law, see VAN GERPEN, supra note 76, at
58-76.
78. "For most journalists... protecting source confidentiality has been seen as an ethical
and professional imperative. Few tenets of journalism are so sacred as that calling for report-
ers to abide by promises of confidentiality." DONALD M. GILLMOR ET AL., MASS COMMUNI-
CATION LAW 358 (5th ed. 1990).
79. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686 (1972); see VAN GERPEN, supra note 76, at 58-
85; Marcus, supra note 64, at 817-20. One commentator has attributed the courts' reluctance
in recognizing a newsgathering privilege comparable to other common law privileges to the
professional bias of lawyers. Monk, supra note 50, at 46.
80. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286 (John T. McNaughton rev., 1961).
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for truth"1 and the legislative branch is best suited to evaluate the con-
flicting interests involved. 2 Critics have doubted journalists' claims that
compelled disclosure would significantly hamper newsgathering s3 They
have expressed concern that a privilege would allow reporters to hide
fabrication84 and immunize themselves from libel suits by plaintiffs who
must prove actual malice.8"
The seeds for constitutional conflict between the courts and journal-
ists were sown in 1958 when actress Judy Garland sued CBS over alleg-
edly defamatory remarks about her girth made by an unnamed network
executive and published in a New York Herald Tribune gossip column.
6
Columnist Marie Torre refused in a deposition to identify the executive;
she contended that compelling her to disclose confidential sources would
violate the First Amendment's protection of the press.8 7 The Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals"8 agreed that compulsory disclosure of journalists'
sources "may entail an abridgment of press freedom by imposing some
limitation upon the availability of news."8 9 Nevertheless, any news-
gathering privilege must yield to the "paramount public interest in the
fair administration of justice."'  Because the identity of the executive
was relevant and material to the case, because it was unavailable from
other sources, and because it "went to the heart" of Garland's claim,
Torre was ordered to answer.91
81. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) ("Testimonial exclusionary rules and
privileges contravene the fundamental principle that 'the public... has a right to every man's
evidence."' (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950))).
82. University of Pa. v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577, 582 (1990).
83. See, e-g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 693 ("Mhe evidence fails to demonstrate that there
would be a significant constriction on the flow of news to the public if this Court reaffirms the
prior common-law and constitutional rule regarding the testimonial obligations of
newsmen.").
84. HERBERT STRENTz, NEWS REPORTERS AND NEWS SOURCES 100 (1989); Marcus,
supra note 64, at 819.
85. See, eg., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 170 (1979); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631,
639-40 (D.C. Cir.), cert dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974).
86. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 547 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); VAN
GERPEN, supra note 76, at 19; Blasi, supra note 48, at 229 n.2.
87. Garland, 259 F.2d at 547.
88. The Garland opinion was written by then-Circuit Judge Potter Stewart, who would
later dissent as a Supreme Court Justice in Branzburg. See 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
89. Garland, 259 F.2d at 548.
90. Id. at 549.
91. Id. at 550-51. Torre served 10 days in jail for contempt of court for refusing to obey
the ruling. MARC A. FRANKLIN & DAVID A. ANDERSON, MASS MEDIA LAW 579 (1990).
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2. Branzburg v. Hayes
Battle was fully joined fourteen years later in Branzburg v. Hayes.92
A four-member plurality of the United States Supreme Court' rejected
the First Amendment privilege claims of three reporters: Paul
Branzburg, a newspaper reporter who witnessed drug preparation and
use in Kentucky; Paul Pappas, a television reporter who spent time in-
side Black Panther headquarters during riots in Boston; and Earl Cald-
well, a newspaper reporter assigned to cover the Black Panthers and
other militant black groups.94 All three resisted grand jury subpoenas;
Kentucky and Massachusetts state courts ruled against Branzburg9 and
Pappas,96 respectively. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly
recognized a First Amendment privilege that could be overcome only by
a government showing of compelling need, and Caldwell's subpoena was
quashed.97
In Branzburg, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit and affirmed the Kentucky and Massachusetts state courts, hold-
ing that journalists had no First Amendment privilege to refuse to an-
swer "relevant and material questions asked during a good-faith grand
jury investigation."9 The plurality rejected the reporters' argument for a
qualified privilege before grand juries,99 but did not address whether a
privilege was available in other judicial proceedings. The Court reasoned
that any negative impact on newsgathering by compelled disclosure was
speculative,"° while grand jury investigations fulfill a fundamental
government role of protecting citizens and their property.101 Congress
92. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
93. Justice White was joined in the plurality opinion by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Blackmun and Rehnquist. Id. at 667. Justice Powell wrote a separate concurring opinion. Id.
at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 667-77.
95. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972); Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1971), aff'd sub nor.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
96. In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971), aff'd sub nor. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972).
97. United States v. Caldwell, 434 F.2d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
98. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 708.
99. The reporters did not claim an absolute privilege to refuse to testify under all circum-
stances. Id. at 680. Rather, they argued that a journalist should not be compelled to appear or
testify before a grand jury unless it is shown that (1) the reporter has information relevant to a
crime under investigation, (2) the information is unavailable from other sources, and (3) the
need for the information is "sufficiently compelling" to justify the infringement on First
Amendment interests. Id.
100. Id. at 693-94.
101. Id. at 700.
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and the state legislatures were free to fashion a statutory privilege for
journalists, 102 but the First Amendment offered protection against only
those grand jury investigations not conducted in good faith, or
undertaken solely to harass the press "to disrupt a reporter's relationship
with his news sources."
10 3
Four justices dissented."° Justice Stewart accused the plurality of
taking a "crabbed view of the First Amendment" that demonstrated "a
disturbing insensitivity to the critical role of an independent press in our
society." 105 The ability to make and keep confidential newsgathering re-
lationships benefited not the private interests of the journalist and source,
but the "'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.' ,o Before
requiring a journalist to disclose confidential sources, the government
should be required to show that (1) the journalist had information clearly
relevant to a crime under investigation, (2) there were no alternative
sources for the information less destructive of First Amendment rights,
and (3) there was a compelling and overriding interest in the
information.
10 7
It is Justice Powell's "enigmatic"' 108 three-paragraph concurring
opinion that has proved most influential-and controversial 1 9-- over the
102. Id. at 706. Congressional efforts to enact a shield law were mounted between 1972 and
1975, but disagreement arose over who should be able to invoke the privilege, what informa-
tion could be withheld, whether the privilege should preempt state laws, and whether the
privilege should be qualified or absolute. VAN GERPEN, supra note 76, at 147-66. The cam-
paign died amid a lack of consensus among journalists and members of Congress, accompanied
by opposition from the Nixon Administration, Id. at 166-70, Some journalists oppose shield
laws altogether, arguing that the news media should rely solely on constitutional protections.
This position rests on the notion that the First Amendment forbids enactment of any law
abridging freedom of the press and the fear that a statutory privilege might be interpreted by
the courts in a way that inhibits, rather than protects, newsgathering. BRUCE M. SWAIN,
REPORTERS' Emics 53 (1978).
Shield laws were in effect in 17 states when Branzburg was decided. Branzburg, 408 U.S.
at 689 n.27. Twenty-eight states have shield laws now. See supra note 10.
103. Branzburg, 408 U.S; at 707-08.
104. Justice Stewart's dissent was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Id. at 725
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas wrote a separate dissenting opinion advocating an
absolute privilege. Id. at 711 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 737-38 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
107. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
109. For discussions regarding the varying interpretations of Justice Powell's concurring
opinion in Branzburg by the federal courts, see Storer Communications, Inc. v. Giovan (In re
Grand Jury Proceedings), 810 F.2d 580, 583-86 (6th Cir. 1987); Karem v. Priest, 744 F. Supp.
136, 138-42 (W.D. Tex. 1990). Both decisions criticized other courts for relying on Justice
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course of time, however.110 Emphasizing the "limited nature" of the plu-
rality's holding, Justice Powell observed that reporters called before a
grand jury were not "without constitutional fights with respect to the
gathering of news or in safeguarding their sources." ' He concluded:
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by
the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press
and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with
respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital consti-
tutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords
with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such
questions.
In short, the courts will be available to newsmen under
circumstances where legitimate First Amendment interests re-
quire protection. 1 2
Justice Powell's opinion appears to defend the plurality's rejection of
any privilege before a grand jury, while simultaneously endorsing a test
that balances freedom of the press against the need for evidence in crimi-
nal cases.1 3 Thus, Justice Powell's concurrence creates a qualified First
Amendment privilege in accord with Justice Stewart's dissent.1 4 Be-
cause Justice Powell's vote was necessary to form a majority, a number
of courts and commentators have viewed his opinion as determinative. 1 '
Powell, rather than the Branzburg plurality. Storer Communications, 810 F.2d at 585; Karem,
744 F. Supp. at 142.
110. Many courts have turned to Justice Powell's concurrence, rather than the plurality
opinion, in determining whether to force a journalist to testify. See, e.g., McGraw-Hill, Inc. v.
Arizona (In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig.), 680 F.2d 5, 8 n.9 (2d Cir.) ("Justice Powell
cast the deciding vote in Branzburg ... and therefore his reservations are particularly impor-
tant in understanding the decision."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982); Bruno & Stillman, Inc.
v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 596 (lst Cir. 1980) (Court is "[flollowing the lead of
Mr. Justice Powell."); Carey, 492 F.2d at 636 ("[T]he Branzburg result appears to have been
controlled by the vote of Justice Powell."). But see Storer Communications, 810 F.2d at 585
("Justice Powell's opinion certainly does not warrant the rewriting of the majority opinion.").
111. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
113. See GILLMOR ET AL., supra note 78, at 360-61 ("Both [Justice] Stewart and Justice
Powell... stress the need for a judge to balance the interests of reporters and of justice .... It
is clear from Powell's concurrence that he would have been more favorably disposed to a
privilege claim under a different fact pattern.").
114. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v.
National Football League, 89 F.R.D. 489, 492 (C.D. Cal. 1981) ("[I]f one aligns Justice Pow-
ell's concurring opinion with Justice Stewart's dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, and with Justice Douglas's dissent, a majority of five justices accepted the proposition
that journalists are entitled to at least a qualified First Amendment privilege.").
115. See, eg., United States v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("IT]he
Branzburg decision is controlled in the last analysis by the concurring opinion of Justice Pow-
ell."); Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505, 510 (E.D. Va. 1976) ("The minimum
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The result has been a qualified First Amendment privilege jurisprudence
that, with the acquiescence of the Supreme Court, has grown in size and
complexity with each passing year.
116
3. Branzburg's progeny
Just five months after Branzburg, the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals began to limit the reach of the Supreme Court's plurality opinion.
In Baker v. F & F Investment, 1 7 a civil action, the appellate court inter-
preted Branzburg as a rejection of an absolute newsgathering privilege, I8
and as an endorsement of a qualified privilege.119 While crime investiga-
tions by grand juries presented a compelling state interest that could
overcome First Amendment protections, subpoenas by civil litigants
lacked such weight. 20 In the eyes of the Baker court, compelled disclo-
sure of confidential sources was to be the exception, not the rule.12
In the footsteps of Baker, other federal courts have endorsed a Gar-
land-based balancing test in civil suits that requires the party seeking the
identities of confidential news sources to show that the information
sought (1) is highly material and relevant, (2) goes "to the heart" of the
party's claim or defense, and (3) is unavailable from alternative
common denominator of all views expressed [in Branzburg] is the opinion of Mr. Justice Pow-
ell, that a qualified priviiege does exist to protect newsmen's confidential sources."); Marcus,
supra note 64, at 838 ("[T]he real question is how Justice Powell would respond to a qualified
privilege claim.").
116. FRANKLIN & ANDERSON, supra note 91, at 600. The Supreme Court has not re-ad-
dressed the issue of a newsgathering privilege since Branzburg, despite many opportunities to
do so. Id. One commentator noted a gradual shift of consensus about the true meaning of
Branzburg from one of rejecting a First Amendment privilege to one in which Justice Powell's
opinion is aligned with the dissenters to create a five-vote majority favoring a qualified privi-
lege. Marcus, supra note 64, at 836 n.151, 837-38. As a result, First Amendment privilege
"has gained such widespread acceptance that its applicability in many situations is no longer
open to question." Morse & Zucker, supra note 14, at 422.
There now might be a shift back toward a more restrictive view of Branzburg, however.
See Goodale & Moodhe, supra note 13, at 306-08. In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, the
Supreme Court observed that Branzburg "rejected the notion that under the First Amendment
a reporter could not be required to appear or to testify as to information obtained in confidence
without a special showing that the reporter's testimony was necessary." 110 S. Ct. 577, 588
(1990). Nevertheless, Justice Powell's opinion has proved to be the hook upon which many
state and an overwhelming majority of federal courts have hung a qualified newsgathering
privilege. See cases cited in supra notes 11-12; GILLMOR ET AL.,. supra note 78, at 360;
Goodale & Moodhe, supra note 13, at 637-38.
117. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
118. Id. at 783.
119. Id. at 784.
120. Id. at 784-85.
121. Id. at 783 (cases are "few in number.., where First Amendment rights must yield").
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sources. 
122
Where the journalist is a defendant in a libel suit and the plaintiff
needs the withheld evidence to show actual malice, courts often require
disclosure. 12 3 In contrast, courts have been reluctant to order disclosure
in civil suits where the journalist is a nonparty witness.1 24 Such decisions
have found that the evidence was not critical to the dispute,1 25 alternative
sources had not been exhausted,1 26 or the constitutional interest in an
122. See, ag., McGraw-Hill, 680 F.2d at 7; Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d
721, 726 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d
708, 717 (3d Cir. 1979); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 438 (10th Cir. 1977);
Carey, 492 F.2d at 636; United States v. Bingham, 765 F. Supp. 954, 958 (N.D. Ill. 1991);
Dillon v. City of San Francisco, 748 F. Supp. 722, 727 (N.D. Cal. 1990); May v. Collins, 122
F.R.D. 535, 540 (S.D. Ind. 1988); Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., 109 F.R.D. 522, 527
(D. Nev. 1985); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1398 (D.D.C. 1973).
At least one federal court has rejected the "heart of the claim" element, requiring instead that
the testimony sought be relevant and not unduly cumulative. United States v. Markiewicz,
732 F. Supp. 316, 320-21 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
The "highly material and relevant" element occasionally has been combined with the
"heart of the claim" element. See, eg., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 359 (3d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
The two elements may be distinguished, however, if relevancy and materiality refer to the
logical relationship between the evidence and the ultimate issue in the underlying case to
which it arguably relates, and "heart of the claim" refers to the necessity of the information for
the resolution of the entire case. Goodale & Moodhe, supra note 13, at 361-62; Morse &
Zucker, supra note 14, at 428-39.
123. See Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 714 ("Proof of actual malice will frequently [require a plaintiff]
to demonstrate that the informant was unreliable .... Protecting the identity of the source
would effectively prevent recovery in many [New York] Times-type libel cases."). Compare
Miller, 621 F.2d at 726 (disclosure ordered because plaintiff would otherwise have no way of
proving defendants misrepresented reports of confidential sources or recklessly relied on those
sources) and Carey, 492 F.2d at 637 (same) with LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Co., 780
F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir.) (plaintiff failed to exhaust alternative sources), cert denied, 479
U.S. 818 (1986) and Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 994-95 (8th Cir. 1972) (compre-
hensive investigation and general accuracy of article made it unlikely that plaintiff could estab-
lish actual malice even if sources disclosed), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
124. See, e.g., McGraw-Hill, 680 F.2d at 9 (disclosure not required in lawsuit by states
claiming oil companies conspired to fix prices through newsletter); Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 714-15
(disclosure not required in civil rights lawsuit against Justice Department for leaks to newspa-
per); Riley, 612 F.2d at 718 (disclosure not required in civil rights lawsuit asserting leaks of
personnel records by city officials); Silkwood, 563 F.2d at 437 (disclosure not required of docu-
mentary filmmaker in lawsuit alleging that employer violated civil rights and contaminated
employee with plutonium radiation); Baker, 470 F.2d at 785 (disclosure not required in civil
rights lawsuit alleging racial discrimination in housing sales); Democratic Natl Comm., 356 F.
Supp. at 1398 (disclosure not required in lawsuit alleging political espionage and burglary).
But see Dillon, 748 F. Supp. at 726-27 (journalist required to give eyewitness testimony in civil
rights lawsuit alleging excessive force by police); NLRB v. Mortensen, 701 F. Supp. 244, 250
(D.D.C. 1988) (reporters required to authenticate quotations by identified sources).
125. See, e.g., McGraw-Hill, 680 F.2d at 9; Riley, 612 F.2d at 718; Baker, 470 F.2d at 783.
126. See, e.g., McGraw-Hill, 680 F.2d at 9; Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 714; Baker, 470 F.2d at 783.
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unfettered press outweighed the civil litigant's interest in the evidence.' 27
Only the Sixth Circuit has interpreted Branzburg as completely rejecting
a qualified privilege.
128
There has been far less agreement regarding the existence or applica-
tion of a privilege in criminal cases. Some federal courts have held that
newsgatherers have no privilege, absolute or qualified, to refuse to testify
before grand juries129 or in any criminal proceeding. 130 Others have rec-
ognized a qualified privilege, but found in a case-by-case analysis that the
competing constitutional interest in a fair trial outweighed the First
Amendment interests underlying the privilege.1 3 ' At least two federal
courts have quashed criminal subpoenas seeking information not gained
in confidence,1 32 but other courts have reasoned that disclosure was
127. See Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 712-13. The court observed:
In general, when striking the balance between the civil litigant's interest in com-
pelled disclosure and the public interest in protecting a newspaper's confidential
sources, we will be mindful of the preferred position of the First Amendment and the
importance of a vigorous press. Efforts will be taken to minimize impingement upon
the reporter's ability to gather news. Thus in the ordinary case the civil litigant's
interest in disclosure should yield to the journalist's privilege. Indeed, if the privilege
does not prevail in all but the most exceptional cases, its value will be substantially
diminished. Unless potential sources are confident that compelled disclosure is un-
likely, they will be reluctant to disclose any confidential information to reporters.
Id. at 712 (citation omitted).
128. Storer Communications, 810 F.2d at 584 & n.6. The court recognized that it was going
against the tide of decisions, but it rejected the premise that Justice Powell's concurring opin-
ion in Branzburg "warrant[s] the rewriting of the majority opinion to grant a first amendment
testimonial privilege to news reporters." Id. at 585.
129. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1975).
130. See, e.g., Storer Communications, 810 F.2d at 584; Karem, 744 F. Supp. at 139.
131. See, eg., United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st Cir. 1988);
Criden, 633 F.2d at 357; United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147-48 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 469 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Markiewicz, 732 F. Supp. at 320-21.
But see United States v. Burke, in which the Second Circuit rejected a racketeering de-
fendant's claim that the trial court improperly quashed his subpoena for "virtually every docu-
ment and tape" in the possession of Sports Illustrated dealing with an article about a basketball
point-shaving scheme. 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983). The de-
fendant contended that the evidence was needed to impeach a key prosecution witness. Id. at
78. The appeal court found that the materials were cumulative, and therefore were not neces-
sary or critical to the maintenance of the defense. Id.
132. See United States v. Lopez, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2203, 2205 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(information in videotape outtakes available to defendant from other sources); United States v.
Blanton, 534 F. Supp. 295, 297 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (reporter not required to verify for prosecution
published quotations attributed to defendant).
In Cuthbertson, the Third Circuit held that qualified First Amendment privilege was not
limited to confidential sources, but extended to reporters' unpublished resource materials, even
if no confidential source was involved. 630 F.2d at 147. "Of course, the lack of a confidential
source may be an important element in balancing the defendant's need for the material sought
against the interest of the journalist in preventing production in a particular case." Id. The
court went on to find that the trial judge could hold an in camera review of videotaped inter-
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appropriate when there was no expectation of 133 or need for134
confidentiality.
A comprehensive review of qualified First Amendment newsgather-
ing privilege is beyond the scope of this Comment . 35 However, an un-
derstanding of the privilege is important because it overlays state laws
136
and has come to fill a major gap resulting from the restrictive procedural
language of California's shield law.'
37
B. California Statutory and Constitutional Immunity
1. Statutory protection
Despite sweeping language that seemingly allows reporters to with-
hold in court all information gathered in the course of their duties but
views for the CBS television news program 60 Minutes that had not been broadcast, since the
defendants could not obtain the tapes elsewhere and they were relevant to the defense case.. Id.
at 148.
133. See LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d at 1181 (television network must provide for in
camera review outtakes sought by defendant of interview with key prosecution witness).
134. See Criden, 633 F.2d at 358-59 (reporter must testify about confidential conversations
with prosecutor who later acknowledged he was source); Markiewicz, 732 F. Supp. at 321
(reporters must testify in criminal prosecution about matters they have already written about).
The lack of a promise of confidentiality has also persuaded courts to reject claims of
privilege in civil cases. See, ag., Dillon, 748 F. Supp. at 726-27 (reporter must testify about
personal observations because no confidential sources or information sought); Mortensen, 701
F. Supp. at 250 (reporters must verify published quotes from identified sources where sources
have denied making the statements). But see Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299, 1302-03
(M.D. Fla. 1975) (reporter not required to testify about or supply notes regarding published
interview with identified source).
135. For discussions of Branzburg and First Amendment privilege, see Morse & Zucker,
supra note 14, at 412-80; Monica Langley & Lee Levine, Branzburg Revisited: Confidential
Sources and First Amendment Values, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 13 (1988); Marcus, supra note
64; James C. Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for News-
men, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709 (1975); Glenn A. Brown, Comment, Just Between You and Me...
For Now: Reexamining a Qualified Privilege for Reporters to Keep Sources Confidential in
Grand Jury Proceedings, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 739 (1988); Sharon K. Malheiro, Note, The
Journalist's Reportorial Privilege-What Does It Protect and What Are Its Limits?, 38 DRAKE
L. REV. 79 (1988); Craig A. Newman, Note, Qualified Privilegefor Journalists, Branzburg v.
Hayes: A Decade Later, 61 U. DETROr J. URBAN L. 463 (1984); Kathryn Jane Humphrey,
Note, Shield Statutes: A Changing Problem in Light of Branzburg, 25 WAYNE L. RaV. 1381
(1979); Susan P. McCarthy, Comment, The First Amendment Newsman's Privilege: From
Branzburg to Farber, 10 SETON HALL L. Rnv. 333 (1979).
136. Courts in states lacking a statutory privilege for journalists have tended to adopt the
qualified privilege and three-part test developed by the federal courts. GILLMOR ET AL., supra
note 78, at 360. In states with a statutory shield law, courts have applied First Amendment
privilege in situations where the statute does not apply. FRANKLIN & ANDERSON, supra note
91, at 601.
137. See Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 283-84, 690 P.2d 625, 635, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 152, 162 (1984) (holding that qualified First Amendment privilege is available when
reporter subject to sanctions other than contempt).
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which is not publicly disseminated, the California shield law,3 is quite
limited in its protection.139 Although often described as a "privilege,"' 40
the law simply prohibits courts from holding reporters in contempt.1 41
This immunity does not bar courts from imposing the other sanctions
that are available when an uncooperative reporter is a party to the litiga-
tion. 42 Nonparty journalists also may be vulnerable to punitive lawsuits
and fines that fall outside a court's contempt power. 143
The limited scope of this immunity, as compared to the broad im-
munity from all sanctions provided by "true" privileges, has been pre-
served in the shield law from the time of its enactment in 1935.44 The
first shield law was added to section 1881 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure 4 1 which also contained testimonial privileges for attorneys, clergy,
physicians, spouses and public officials.' 46 The statute provided that
newspaper publishers, editors, or reporters could not be held in contempt
for refusing to disclose sources to a court, the legislature, or any adminis-
trative body. 47
The immunity eventually was extended to employees of radio and
television stations, press associations and wire services. 148 It was sepa-
rated from the traditional privileges when the privileges and the shield
law were transferred to the California Evidence Code in 1965.141 In
138. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1991).
139. KSDO v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 379, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211, 213 (1982).
140. See Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 396-98, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608,
612-13 (1979); CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 250, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421, 426
(1978).
141. Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 797 n.6, 789 P.2d 934, 939 n.6, 268 Cal.
Rptr. 753, 758 n.6 (1990); KSDO, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 379-80, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 214. Few
states have limited their shield laws in this manner. Montana and New York also have shield
laws immunizing journalists only from contempt. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to -903
(1989); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1991). Georgia's new shield
law is similar in that it applies only when the journalist is not a party to the action. See GA.
CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (Michie 1990).
142. Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 274, 690 P.2d at 628, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 155. For example, if a
journalist refuses to identify sources to a plaintiff in a defamation action, a court could enter a
default judgment against the defendant or invoke an irrebuttable presumption that no source
exists, making it impossible for the defendant to contend that relying on the source was reason-
able. Langley & Levine, supra note 135, at 25.
143. See infra notes 377-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of recent attempts to
skirt the shield law's immunity from contempt.
144. Ch. 532, § 1, 1935 Cal. Stat. 1608.
145. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1881(6) (repealed 1965).
146. Id. § 1881(1)-(5) (repealed 1965).
147. Id. § 1881(6) (repealed 1965).
148. Ch. 629, § 1, 1961 Cal. Stat. 1797.
149. Ch. 299, § 2, 1965 Cal. Stat. 1297. The lawyer-client, spousal, physician-patient, psy-
chotherapist-patient and clergy-penitent privileges are now codified at §§ 950-1034 of the Evi-
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drafting the Evidence Code, the California Law Revision Commission
expressed concern about the shield law's ambiguities and broad sweep
and concluded that it created an absolute privilege.1"' The Commission
recommended enactment of a new, qualified rule allowing compelled dis-
closure of sources if "required in the public interest or otherwise required
to prevent injustice."15' The Assembly Judiciary Committee rejected
this proposal and transferred the shield law into the Evidence Code as
section 1070 without change.
5 2
The scope of section 1070 was extended in 1971'"1 to include former
newspersons and, in 1972, ' 4 to include the proceedings of any body hav-
ing power to issue subpoenas. In 1974, the California Legislature
amended the statute again,' 55 adding employees of magazines and other
periodicals to the list of those protected.' 56
The 1974 amendment also made the most significant change since
the original law was drafted, by expanding the shield law to cover an
entirely new class of information. 57  Previously, a newsperson only
could refuse to identify sources, 58 but the addition of subsection (c) and
dence Code. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 950-1034 (West 1966 & Supp. 1991). The newsgatherer's
immunity from contempt is codified at § 1070. Id. § 1070.
150. 6 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES 481, 484-
85 (1964). "Despite the absence of reliable evidence in the form of legislative history or judi-
cial interpretation, the effect of the statutory privilege in California appears to be a carte
blanche grant of an absolute and unqualified privilege to newsmen to refuse to disclose the
source of any information procured for and used in the protected news media." 6 id. at 484.
"There is no apparent exception to the operation of the privilege.... There is no safeguard
against abuse." 6 id. at 485.
151. 7 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES 207 (1965).
152. 7 id. at 913. The Committee, however, added a comment emphasizing § 1070's lim-
ited protection:
Section 1070 continues without change the provisions of subdivision 6 of the Code of
Civil Procedure Section 1881. It should be noted that Section 1070, like the existing
law, provides an immunity from being adjudged in contempt; it does not create a
privilege. Thus, the section will not prevent the use of other sanctions for refusal of a
newsman to make discovery when he is a party to a civil proceeding.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 assembly committee comment (West 1966).
153. Ch. 1717, § 1, 1971 Cal. Stat. 3658. The change was prompted by the jailing of former
reporter Bill Farr after the decision in Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 342 (1971), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972); see infra notes 243-50 and accompanying
text.
154. Ch. 1431, § 1, 1972 Cal. Stat. 3126.
155. Ch. 1456, § 2, 1974 Cal. Stat. 3184.
156. One court has held that the shield law does not extend to freelance authors unless they
have a contractual arrangement with a publisher. In re Van Ness, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2563 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County 1982).
157. Ch. 1456, § 2, 1974 Cal. Stat. 3184; Hammarley, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 397, 153 Cal.
Rptr. at 612-13.
158. Hammarley, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 396, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
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a revised subsection (a) allows a journalist to refuse to disclose any "un-
published information" gained while "gathering, receiving or processing
*.. information for communication to the public." 15 9 This expansion of
the shield law beyond sources spawned a heated debate in the trial and
appellate courts over the law's scope; the dispute remained unresolved
until the California Supreme Court's decision in Delaney v. Superior
Court.16°
Facially, Evidence Code section 1070 allows any publisher, editor,
reporter, or any other employee of a newspaper, magazine, periodical,
press association, wire service, or radio or television station subpoenaed
by any court or legislative or administrative body to refuse to disclose
(1) any source of information procured in their employment, or (2) any
information not disseminated to the public that was obtained during
newsgathering activities, without the threat of being held in contempt.'61
The immunity, and thus the decision whether to withhold evidence in the
face of a subpoena, is held by the journalist, not by the source.
1 62
159. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070.
160. 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990).
161. Section 1070 provides:
(a) A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed
upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, or by a press associa-
tion or wire service, or any person who has been so connected or employed, cannot
be adjudged in contempt by a judicial, legislative, administrative body, or any other
body having the power to issue subpoenas, for refusing to disclose, in any proceeding
as defined in Section 901, the source of any information procured while so connected
or employed for publication in a newspaper, magazine or other periodical publica-
tion, or for refusing to disclose any unpublished information obtained or prepared in
gathering, receiving or processing of information for communication to the public.
(b) Nor can a radio or television news reporter or other person connected with
or employed by a radio or television station, or any person who has been so con-
nected or employed, be so adjudged in contempt for refusing to disclose the source of
any information procured while so connected or employed for news or news com-
mentary purposes on radio or television, or for refusing to disclose any unpublished
information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information
for communication to the public.
(c) As uged in this section, "unpublished information" includes information
not disseminated to the public by the person from whom disclosure is sought,
whether or not related information has been disseminated and includes, but is not
limited to, all notes, outtakes, photographs, tapes or other data of whatever sort not
itself disseminated to the public through a medium of communication, whether or
not published information based upon or related to such material has been
disseminated.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070.
162. The newsgatherer holds the privilege under qualified First Amendment jurisprudence,
and it cannot be waived by other persons. United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981). A witness making a claim of immunity under
the California shield law must invoke it as he or she would invoke a privilege. Delaney, 50 Cal.
3d at 806 n.20, 789 P.2d at 946 n.20, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 765 n.20. The newsgatherer must prove
that all the requirements of the shield law have been met. Id. The litigant seeking discovery
must then convince the court that he or she holds a constitutional right "sufficiently clear and
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The shield law's broad sweep, absolute terms and prohibition on the
sanction of contempt has caused California courts to grapple with three
issues: (1) its application in civil versus criminal proceedings; (2) its
availability in actions in which the journalist is a party versus those in
which he or she is not; and (3) its protection of confidential versus non-
confidential sources and information.1
63
2. State constitutional status
In the wake of two decisions holding the shield law inapplicable
when courts demand that newsgatherers identify sources who violated
court orders," 4 the legislature offered voters Proposition 5,165 which in-
corporated section 1070 of the Evidence Code into the California Consti-
tution as article I, section 2(b). 16 6 With no organized opposition and no
ballot arguments urging its rejection, Proposition 5 was approved with
seventy-three percent of the vote.' 67 While twenty-eight states have
shield laws,' 68 only California has given the protection constitutional
status. 169
Proponents of Proposition 5 believed that placing section 1070 in
the state constitution would deter the courts from carving more excep-
tions into an immunity that appeared absolute on its face.170 Article I,
section 2(b) displaced Evidence Code section 1070 as the law in Califor-
important to overcome a newsperson's claim of immumity." New York Times Co. v. Superior
Court, 51 Cal. 3d 453, 462 n.ll, 796 P.2d 811, 816 n.ll, 273 Cal. Rptr. 98, 103 n.ll (1990).
163. See Amy R. Bach, Comment, Pressing California Shield Law on Criminal Defendants:
A Weighting Game, 11 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 461, 470-71 (1989).
164. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 224, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 450 (1975),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Farr, 22 Cal. App. 3d at 72, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 350; see infra
notes 243-57 and accompanying text.
165. Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 4, 1978 Cal.'Stat. 77.
166. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b). Before Proposition 5, art. I, § 2 provided: "Every person
may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 2 (amended 1980). This provision was designated subdivision (a) by Proposi-
tion 5, and all three subdivisions of the statutory shield law became art. I, § 2, subdivision (b).
Where § 1070 of the Evidence Code states that a newsperson "cannot be adjudged in
contempt," art. I, § 2(b) states that a newsperson "shall not be adjudged in contempt." Com-
pare CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b) with CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070. In statutes, "cannot" and
"shall not" are equivalent. Gleason v. Spray, 81 Cal. 217, 220, 22 P. 551, 552 (1889).
167. MARCH FONG Eu, SECRETARY OF STATE, SUPPLEMENT TO STATEMENT OF VOTE,
PRIMARY ELECTION JUNE 3, 1980, at 6-8.
168. For a list of the 28 states that have enacted shield laws, see supra note 10.
169. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b).
170. In the ballot argument supporting Proposition 5, proponents claimed that the free flow
of information was being "threatened by actions of some members of the California Judiciary
[who] have created exceptions to the current Newsman's Shield Law.... By giving existing
law constitutional status, judges will have to give the protection greater weight before attempt-
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nia and gave journalists a state constitutional right171 that could yield
only to a federal or another state constitutional right. 172 Nevertheless,
ambiguities remained because the language of section 1070 was copied
into the state constitution virtually unchanged.173 Rather than fixing the
shield law's problems, the legislature and the voters simply carried them
into the constitution and amplified the misunderstanding among the me-
dia and the judiciary as to the practical effect of the law. 174
V. CALIFORNIA COURTS AND THE NEWSGATHERER'S PRIVILEGE
Long before the California Supreme Court finally tackled the shield
law's ambiguities in Delaney v. Superior Court,175 a state appellate court
observed that "[t]he judicial history and case interpretation of the news-
person's privilege.., are just as tortuous and confused as its legislative
origins." 176  The shield law was unavailable to journalists defending
against defamation suits.177 Where it was available, its language prom-
ised absolute protection. 17  Yet courts interpreting the statute found it
inapplicable whenever a judge sought information about people violating
court orders, 179 when a journalist witnessed criminal activity, 180 and
when the news sources were no longer confidential.181 Courts also found
ing to compel reporters to breach their pledges of confidentiality." CALIFORNIA BALLOT
PAMPHLET, PRIMARY ELECTION JUNE 3, 1980, at 19 (Argument in Favor of Proposition 5).
171. Playboy Enters. v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 28, 201 Cal. Rptr. 207, 218
(1984). The court reasoned:
It has long been acknowledged that our state Constitution is the highest expression of
the will of the people acting in their sovereign capacity as to matters of state law.
When the Constitution speaks plainly on a particular matter, it must be given effect
as the paramount law of the state.
Id.
172. See New York Times Co., 51 Cal. 3d at 462, 796 P.2d at 816, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
173. KSDO, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 381-82, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 214-15.
174. See generally Henry C. Kevane, Comment, The Newsgatherer's Shield-Why Waste
Space in the California Constitution?, 15 Sw. U. L. REv. 527 (1985) (arguing that narrow
construction of shield law makes provision "nonfunctional surplusage").
175. 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990).
176. KSDO v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 382, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211, 215 (1982).
177. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 274, 690 P.2d 625, 628, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152,
155 (1984); KSDO, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 384, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
178. See CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 2(b) (newsperson "shall not be adjudged in contempt");
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1991) (newsperson "cannot be adjudged in contempt").
179. Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 71, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342, 349 (1971), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
180. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 218-19, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 446 (1975),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
181. CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 250, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421, 426 (1978).
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that the shield law, both as a statute182 and as a constitutional provi-
sion, 183 could be overcome whenever a criminal defendant demonstrated
a need for the information. The constitutional provision also was held to
be unavailable when a journalist had information about a public event.
184
The state supreme court endorsed a broad interpretation of the
shield law's scope in Delaney, but the decision has created more uncer-
tainty about when the law can be invoked successfully. 85 Consequently,
relying on the shield law has become an increasingly risky business for
journalists.
186
Reporters and editors typically find themselves on the witness stand
in three circumstances: (1) as a party to a lawsuit; (2) as a nonparty
witness in a civil action; or (3) as a nonparty witness in a criminal prose-
cution.1 87 The newsperson's legal standing and the varying competing
interests have resulted in the creation of different rules for each situation.
Further complicating any review, and confusing some courts, attorneys
and journalists,18 8 is the fact that California has two tracks of analysis:
(1) the protection offered by section 1070 of the Evidence Code and arti-
cle I, section 2(b) of the California Constitution,"89 and (2) the qualified
First Amendment newsgathering privilege developed in the wake of
Branzburg v. Hayes.190
A. The Newsgatherer as a Party in Civil Actions
Although the shield law prohibits contempt as a sanction for jour-
nalists who refuse to testify, it does not preclude the imposition of other
sanctions that become available when a journalist is a party to the ac-
182. Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 402, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608, 616
(1979).
183. Hallissy v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 1046, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635, 639
(1988).
184. Liggett v. Superior Court, 224 Cal. App. 3d 426, 443-44, 260 Cal. Rptr. 161, 171
(1989), vacated, 800 P.2d 516, 275 Cal. Rptr. 160 (Cal. 1990); Delaney v. Superior Court, 215
Cal. App. 3d 681, 691, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60, 66 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, 50 Cal. 3d 785,
789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990). But see New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 215
Cal. App. 3d 672, 679, 248 Cal. Rptr. 426, 429-30 (1988) (holding that shield law is absolute
when journalist is called as nonparty witness in civil action), aff'd, 51 Cal. 3d 453, 796 P.2d
811, 273 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1990).
185. See infra notes 330-76 for a discussion of the Delaney balancing test.
186. See infra notes 450-74 and accompanying text.
187. See CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES, supra note 9, at 2.
188. KSDO, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 379-80, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
189. See infra notes 301-26 and accompanying text.
190. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). See supra notes 92-134 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Branzburg and qualified First Amendment newsgathering privilege.
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tion,191 most often as a defendant in a defamation suit. In these circum-
stances, a journalist may rely only on the qualified protections of the
First Amendment.
1 92
That this federal constitutional privilege remains available to jour-
nalists unable to invoke the California shield law was first recognized in
KSDO v. Superior Court.93 An appellate court rejected the media de-
fendants' contention that the shield law should be interpreted broadly to
forbid any type of sanction, 194 and emphasized the narrow legal circum-
stances in which the shield law could be invoked:
The description "shield law" conjures up visions of broad pro-
tection and sweeping privilege. The California shield law, how-
ever, is unique in that it affords only limited protection. It does
not create a privilege for newspeople [that would prohibit all
types of sanctions], rather it provides an immunity from being
adjudged in contempt. This rather basic distinction has been
misstated and apparently misunderstood by members of the
news media and our courts as well.
195
Even so, the KSDO court did not leave defamation defendants with-
out protection when they refuse to testify or comply with discovery. It
embarked on a balancing analysis under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution, relying on Justice Powell's concurring opin-
ion in Branzburg v. Hayes. 96 Newsgatherers would be able to safeguard
confidential information when necessary to ensure the free flow of infor-
mation to the public, even when the shield law was unavailable.
197
191. KSDO v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 384, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211, 216 (1982).
Available sanctions in a libel suit include striking an uncooperative reporter's defenses or
awarding the plaintiff a default judgment. Id. See supra notes 60-62 for cases imposing civil
sanctions when journalists refused to identify sources.
192. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 283-84, 690 P.2d 625, 635, 208 Cal. Rptr.
152, 162 (1984).
193. 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1982). In KSDO, a radio reporter broadcast
a news report stating that Riverside police were under investigation for allegedly using police
cars to transport heroin into the city from Tijuana. Id. at 378, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 212. Police
officers sued for defamation and sought production of the reporter's notes and other docu-
ments relating to the reporter's conversations with the story's sources, whom the reporter
identified in a deposition. Id. at 379, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 213. The trial court ordered disclosure,
holding that the shield law was inapplicable when the invoking newsperson was a party to the
action. Id.
194. Id. at 383-84, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
195. Id. at 379-80, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
The KSDO court also found the constitutionalization of the shield law irrelevant, because
art. I, § 2(b) did not alter the contempt language of § 1070 of the Evidence Code. Id. at 383,
186 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
196. 408 U.S. 665, 709-10 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
197. KSDO, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 385, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 217. "[A]fter careful examination,
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In Mitchell v. Superior Court,19 8 the California Supreme Court
adopted KSDO's narrow interpretation of the shield law's procedural
application and recognized the independent protection provided by the
United States Constitution. A unanimous court held that a qualified
First Amendment privilege'9 9 was available to newsgatherers in circum-
stances falling outside the scope of the shield law.2"° Justice Broussard,
writing for the court, identified five factors courts must weigh in deciding
whether to compel disclosure of confidential sources or unpublished in-
formation supplied by those sources.2°0
Branzburg and other cases interpreting Branzburg stand for a qualified newspersons' privilege
to safeguard confidential sources and materials where the privilege furthers the First Amend-
ment interest of the free flow of information." Id.
The availability of a First Amendment privilege, the KSDO court decided, depended on
(1) whether the proceeding was criminal or civil, (2) whether the newsperson was a party to
the action, (3) whether there were alternative sources for the information, and (4) whether the
information sought went to the "heart of the claim." Id. at 386-87, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 217. The
requirement that newsgatherers disclose confidential information to litigants if there are no
alternative sources and the evidence goes to the "heart of the claim" wis first announced in
Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 550 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); see supra
notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
Although the reporter in KSDO was a party to the action, and the truth or falsity of the
news report was an essential issue in the case, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to show
that the information sought was unavailable from other sources or actually went to the heart of
the claim. KSDO, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 386, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 217-18. A writ of mandate was
granted reversing the trial court's discovery order. Id., 186 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
198. 37 Cal. 3d 268, 690 P.2d 625, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1984).
In Mitchell, the Synanon Church and its leader, Charles Dederich, obtained a discovery
order in their libel suit against Reader's Digest and David and Cathy Mitchell, owners of the
tiny Point Reyes Light newspaper. Id. at 272, 690 P.2d at 627-28, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 154-55.
Reader's Digest had published an article recounting how the Mitchells had won the Pulitzer
Prize for their reporting on Synanon, in which it stated that Synanon raised money with false
claims that it was rehabilitating drug addicts. Id. at 272, 690 P.2d at 627, 208 Cal. Rptr. at
154. Reader's Digest revealed its sources for its article, and among them were the Mitchells.
Id. at 273, 690 P.2d at 627, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 154. The trial court then ordered the Mitchells
to provide every document they had referring or relating to Dederich and Synanon. Id.
199. Id. at 274, 690 P.2d at 628, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 155. The court noted that a common law
newsgatherer's privilege independent of the United States Constitution was recognized in Riley
v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979), and Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 641
P.2d 1180 (Wash. 1982). Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 274 n.3, 690 P.2d at 628 n.3, 208 Cal. Rptr. at
155 n.3. Such reasoning is impermissible in California, however, because the Evidence Code
bars common law privileges. Id. Under California law, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by
statute: (a) No person has a privilege to refuse to be a witness. (b) No person has a privilege to
refuse to disclose any matter or to refuse to produce any writing, object, or other thing." CAL.
EVID. CODE § 911 (West 1966). However, § 911 cannot bar recognition of privileges founded
on the constitution. Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 274 n.3, 690 P.2d at 628 n.3, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 155
n.3.
200. Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 283-84, 690 P.2d at 635, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
201. Id. at 279, 690 P.2d at 632, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159. It is useful to note that the Mitchell
court applied First Amendment privilege to promises of confidentiality, departing from the
positions of some federal courts applying the privilege to non-confidential information. See,
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First, is the reporter a party to a civil action? In a defamation suit,
disclosure is usually appropriate, but "by no means . . . automatic.
'20 2
Second, how relevant is the information to the cause of action? "Mere
relevance is insufficient to compel discovery; disclosure should be denied
unless the information goes 'to the heart of the plaintiff's claim.' ,12o3
Third, has the plaintiff exhausted all alternative sources of obtaining the
information? Compelled disclosure of sources is the "last resort" and
should be used only if the plaintiff shows there is no other practical way
to obtain the information. 2" Fourth, how important is it to protect the
pledge of confidentiality? Compelled disclosure may be denied when the
information "relates to matters of great public importance" and when
there is a substantial risk of harm to the source.205 Fifth, in a defamation
action, has the plaintiff made a prima facie showing that the alleged de-
famatory statements are false? Only if falsity is established as a jury
question should disclosure be compelled. 2"
By recognizing a First Amendment privilege, the Mitchell decision
filled a gap created by the shield law's limited immunity from con-
tempt.20 7 The California Supreme Court saw this qualified privilege as
one with teeth: disclosure would not be compelled unless the evidence
was crucial to the action and unavailable elsewhere.208
B. The Newsgatherer as a Nonparty Witness in Civil Actions
As a state constitutional provision, the shield law has proven most
useful to newsgatherers subpoenaed in civil suits in which they are not
e-g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126
(1981).
202. Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 279, 690 P.2d at 632, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
203. Id. at 280, 690 P.2d at 632, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159 (quoting Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d
545, 550 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958)).
204. d. at 282, 690 P.2d at 634, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
205. Id. at 282-83, 690 P.2d at 634, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
206. Id. at 283, 690 P.2d at 634, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 161. The Mitchell court concluded that
the discovery order must be reversed because Dederich and Synanon had failed to show that
they had exhausted alternative sources, that the broad discovery requested was necessary to
the claim, and that the statements were false. Id. at 283-84, 690 P.2d at 635, 208 Cal. Rptr. at
162.
207. Id. The court observed:
In conclusion, the superior court in this case ordered extensive disclosure of sources
and information on the ground that there was no reporter's privilege in California.
We have concluded that the basis for this ruling was erroneous; that the California
courts should recognize a qualified reporter's privilege, depending upon a balancing
of the relevant considerations in each case.
Id.
208. Id. at 280-82, 690 P.2d at 632-34, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159-61.
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parties. With one exception,2 °9 California courts have held consistently
that the right of civil litigants to relevant evidence does not rise to the
level of the state constitutional right allowing newsgatherers to withhold
identities of sources and unpublished information.21
The shield law's sweeping, absolute protection of unpublished infor-
mation sought from nonparty journalist witnesses in civil proceedings
was recognized in Playboy Enterprises v. Superior Court.2" There, an
appellate court concluded that civil litigants have no rights sufficient to
overcome the absolute immunity from contempt granted by article I, sec-
tion 2(b) of the California Constitution. 2  It rejected a qualified privi-
lege-style balancing test for evidence falling under the shield law, holding
that application of the KSDO v. Superior Court"' criteria "would evis-
cerate the newsperson's protection.
214
Nonconfidential resource materials held by Playboy magazine were
clearly protected under the shield law, the court reasoned, because the
trial court could compel disclosure only with its contempt power.215 By
placing section 1070 in the state constitution, the voters manifested the
intent to give newspersons "the highest possible level of protection from
compelled disclosure." '216 The state interest in promoting full discovery
in civil litigation must yield to the clear mandate of paramount state law,
the California Constitution.21 7
209. See Liggett v. Superior Court, 224 Cal. App. 3d 426, 443-44, 260 Cal. Rptr. 161, 171
(1989) (holding that newsgatherers cannot withhold observations of public events), vacated,
800 P.2d 516, 275 Cal. Rptr. 160 (Cal. 1990). The Liggett holding was rejected by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 453, 462, 796 P.2d
811, 816, 273 Cal. Rptr. 98, 103 (1990).
210. New York Times Co., 51 Cal. 3d at 462, 796 P.2d at 816, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 103; Play-
boy Enters. v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 28, 201 Cal. Rptr. 207, 218 (1984).
211. 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 201 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1984).
In Playboy Enterprises, the defendants in a breach of contract and fiduciary duty suit
obtained a trial court order requiring Playboy Enterprises to produce in discovery all records
and editorial materials relating to a Playboy magazine interview of the plaintiffs, comedians
Richard "Cheech" Matin and Thomas Chong. Id. at 17-18, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 211. The de-
fendants, the duo's former business agents, contended that Chong's remarks in the interview
revealed that Main and Chong voluntarily entered into an agreement with the agents knowing
it would not be lucrative. Kevane, supra note 174, at 530-32. When Chong denied in deposi-
tion that he had made the statements, the defendants subpoenaed the Playboy interviewer's
notes, tapes and records. Playboy Enters, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 17-18, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
212. Playboy Enters., 154 Cal. App. 3d at 28, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
213. 135 Cal. App. 3d 375, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1982); see supra notes 193-97 and accom-
panying text.
214. Playboy Enters., 154 Cal. App. 3d at 27, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 27, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 217-18.
217. Id. at 28, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:155
The absolute protection recognized in Playboy Enterprises 2 18 was re-
jected in Liggett v. Superior Court,z19 causing a split among the appellate
courts.22 The Liggett court confused the shield law's absolute immunity
from contempt with the qualified First Amendment privilege recognized
by the California Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Superior Court,221 and
excepted from shield law protection journalists' observations of public
events.222 Even though the shield law prohibited the trial court in Lig-
gett from holding a television cameraman in contempt for refusing to
testify, the appellate court held that a newsgatherer's right to withhold
evidence was contingent on passing the Mitchell balhncing test.223  The
confusion in Liggett was aggravated further by the court's adoption of a
"public event" exception that was based on a review of the shield law's
218. Id.
219. 224 Cal. App. 3d 426, 260 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1989), vacated, 800 P.2d 516, 275 Cal. Rptr.
160 (Cal. 1990).
220. The conflict among the appellate courts was discussed by the California Supreme
Court in Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 803-04, 789 P.2d 934, 944-45, 268 Cal.
Rptr. 753, 763-64 (1990).
221. Liggett, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 441-43, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 170; see Mitchell v. Superior
Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 283-84, 690 P.2d 625, 635, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152, 162 (1984).
222. Liggett, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 443-44, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
The Liggett dispute arose when a load of packaged meat spilled from a truck onto a
freeway in Bakersfield. Id. at 429, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 161-62. As a KERO-TV cameraman was
filming an interview with a highway patrolman, John Liggett's automobile struck accident
debris, skidded out of control and flipped over, seriously injuring Liggett. Id. at 429, 260 Cal.
Rptr. at 162. Liggett sued the owner of the meat truck and the State. Id. KERO-TV supplied
Liggett with a copy of the film it broadcast after the accident, but filed a motion to quash when
Liggett subpoenaed the cameraman to testify at a deposition. Id. The trial court granted the
motion. Id. at 430-31, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
223. Id. at 443, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 170. After a review of Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972), and its progeny, the Liggett court adopted what it represented as Professor Tribe's
conclusion that there is no First Amendment privilege to protect confidential sources and then,
ironically, based its ruling on Mitchell's interpretation of Branzburg case law. Liggett, 224
Cal. App. 3d at 433, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
Justice Baxter, author of the Liggett decision, misread Professor Tribe, however.
Although Professor Tribe expressed concerns about the United States Supreme Court's refusal
to recognize a First Amendment privilege in Branzburg and Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153
(1979) (holding that newsgatherers' thoughts and conversations with colleagues were not privi-
leged in libel actions by public figures), he observed that "lower federal courts have consist-
ently read [Branzburg] to support some kind of qualified privilege for reporters." TRiBE, supra
note 2, § 12-22, at 976. Professor Tribe's position is contra that represented by Justice Baxter.
Tribe states:
[Q]ualified privileges... are arguably required by the first amendment's implicit
guarantee against undue interference with the acquisition of knowledge.... Given
the problems that required disclosure of confidences creates for effective information
gathering, traditional first amendment theory should prohibit government compul-
sion of such disclosure-from reporters or other researchers-absent a demonstra-
tion that the legal system lacks a less inhibiting alternative.
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legislative history and ballot arguments for Proposition 5.224 The court
held that the cameraman must testify because "happenstance" observa-
tions of events that occur in public, in contrast to information from confi-
dential sources, do not fall within the protection of what the court
lumped together as the "shield law and privilege."22
This division over the applicability of the shield law in nonparty
civil litigation situations was resolved by the California Supreme Court in
New York Times Co. v. Superior Court."22 In two paragraphs, a unani-
mous court227 dispensed with the Liggett confusion: by its terms, the
224. Liggett, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 443-44, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 171. The court reasoned:
Compelling a newsperson to disclose the identity of a confidential source or unpub-
lished information from such a source would seriously undermine and interfere with
the news gathering function. This underlying reason for creating the shield law and
privilege simply does not exist in the instant case where the information sought was
observed by happenstance in public, is not from a confidential source, and is not even
the work product of the cameraman.
Id. at 442-43, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
225. Id. at 442-43, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 171. The court did not attempt to define "public
event" or "happenstance." Arguably, a one-on-one interview in a restaurant is a public event,
despite promises of confidentiality. It also is unclear why the court concluded that the TV
cameraman's presence at the scene was happenstance, since he was sent there by the television
station while on duty and he was observing and filming events to provide a news report for the
station's viewers. See id. at 429, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
226. 51 Cal. 3d 453, 796 P.2d 811, 273 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1990).
Volkswagen of America, Inc., defending itself against a products liability lawsuit, had
issued a subpoena for photographs of an automobile accident taken by a photographer for the
Santa Barbara News-Press. New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. App. 3d 672,
674, 248 Cal. Rptr. 426, 426-27 (1988), aff'd, 51 Cal. 3d 453, 796 P.2d 811, 273 Cal. Rptr. 98
(1990). When the News-Press, which is owned by the New York Times Co., refused to let
Volkswagen compare the News-Press's unpublished accident photographs with those Volks-
wagen obtained from the California Highway Patrol, the trial court ruled that only a qualified
privilege applied and it would review the photographs in camera to determine if the privilege
was outweighed by Volkswagen's right to discovery of relevant information. Id. at 675, 248
Cal. Rptr. at 427. The court of appeal reversed, adopting the Playboy Enterprises position that
nonparty newsgatherers held an unqualified protection against subpoenas from civil litigants.
Id. at 678-79, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 430. The court observed:
Whether the photographs sought are bound for oblivion in a wastebasket or have
some special significance to the News-Press is not important. The newsgatherer on
the beat does not have to worry about potential uses of his or her material in third
party actions. The [state] Constitution and the statute recognize that a news-
gatherer's information must be protected whether or not that information comes
from a cofifidential source.
Id. at 679, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 429-30.
227. Justice Mosk dissented only with respect to the majority's holding that the Santa Bar-
bara News-Press's petition for extraordinary relief was premature because the newspaper had
not yet been cited for contempt. New York Times Co., 51 Cal. 3d at 464, 796 P.2d at 818, 273
Cal. Rptr. at 105 (Mosk, J., dissenting). The majority held that precontempt appellate review
was inappropriate because the trial court had not yet ascertained whether the sought-after
information came within the scope of the shield law and whether contempt was the proper
sanction for nondsclosure. Id. at 459-60, 796 P.2d at 814-15, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 101-02. No
relief was available until a judgment of contempt is entered. Id. at 460, 796 P.2d at 815, 273
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shield law does not provide for a balancing test, so such an approach is
necessary only when the immunity conflicts with federal or other state
constitutional rights.228 A litigant's "showing of need" for the sought-
after material is insufficient; the party seeking disclosure must assert a
competing state or federal constitutional right.229 The newspaper there-
fore had an absolute immunity from contempt 230 for withholding traffic
accident photographs sought by the defendant in a civil suit.
231
C. The Newsgatherer as a Witness in Criminal Proceedings
1. The road to Delaney v. Superior Court
When confronted with the competing, constitutionally protected
rights of criminal defendants,232 California courts have forced the shield
law to yield in either its scope or its application. Before the California
Supreme Court's decision in Delaney v. Superior Court,233 courts tended
to carve exceptions into the law's scope, finding that the immunity was
unavailable to journalists questioned about (1) court investigations, 234 (2)
Cal. Rptr. at 102. The court went on to decide the other issues, however, because "no purpose
would be served by remanding the case to the trial court merely for the purpose of entering a
contempt judgment." Id. at 461, 796 P.2d at 815, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
Justice Mosk argued that appellate review was appropriate "once it is clear that contempt
is imminent. The reporter should not be required to await writ review until he has suffered the
humiliation of being held in contempt by a judge and a bailiff has placed him in handcuffs and
led him off to jail." Id. at 470, 796 P.2d at 821-22, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 108-09 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
228. Id. at 461-62, 796 P.2d at 816, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
229. See id. at 462, 796 P.2d at 816, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 103. Volkswagen had not asserted a
competing constitutional right. Id. The court limited the holding to the facts of the case,
however-noting that "in a future case" a civil litigant seeking discovery from a nonparty
newsgatherer might present a state or federal constitutional right that must be weighed against
the immunity provided by the shield law. Id. at 462 n.11, 796 P.2d at 816 n. 11,273 Cal. Rptr.
at 103 n. 11. "A trial court in such a case, however, should carefully consider whether the
asserted constitutional right is sufficiently clear and important to overcome a newsperson's
claim of immunity, which is grounded in a specific constitutional provision-article 1, section
2(b)." Id.
230. Because the shield law provides only an immunity from contempt, the court accepted
the contention of Volkswagen that the Santa Barbara News-Press could be subject to sanctions
under § 1992 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides for a civil action to recover
damages from a witness who disobeys a subpoena. Id. at 464, 796 P.2d at 818, 273 Cal. Rptr.
at 105; see CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1992 (West 1983). See infra notes 380-85 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the court's holding.
231. New York Times Co., 51 Cal. 3d at 464, 796 P.2d at 818, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
232. "No right ranks higher than the right of the accused to a fair trial." Press-Enterprise
Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984).
233. 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990).
234. See Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 224, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 450
(1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 71, 99
Cal. Rptr. 342, 349 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
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eyewitness observations of crimes 2 35 and (3) information not held in con-
fidence.236 Other courts adopted a broad interpretation of the shield
law's scope, accepting the plain language of the provision, but limited the
law's application by employing balancing tests2 37 akin to qualified First
Amendment privilege.
238
The state supreme court finally tackled the dispute in Delaney,
twenty years after California judges began jailing uncooperative reporters
who fell within the shield law's facial protection.239 The Delaney court
adopted a broad reading of the law's scope,2 ' but crafted a new balanc-
ing test providing journalists with less protection than that afforded by
many federal courts241 and earlier state appellate rulings.242
a. what information is protected?
Before Delaney, the courts carved the first exception into the shield
law for themselves: journalists could not invoke the statutory immunity
from contempt in defiance of a judge seeking information for the court's
own purposes. The rule, spawned in Farr v. Superior Court,243 was
thrown into doubt when the shield law was copied into the state constitu-
tion2 4 and appears to have been rejected by the state supreme court in
Delaney.245
In Farr, a newspaper reporter refused to answer a judge's questions
235. See Rosato, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 218-19, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
236. CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 250, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421, 426 (1978).
237. See Hallissy v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 1045-46, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635,
639 (1988); Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 402, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608, 616
(1979).
238. See supra notes 117-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of qualified First
Amendment newsgathering privilege.
239. See infra note 250 for a discussion of the jailing of reporter Bill Farr and infra note 253
for a discussion of the jailing of the "Bee Four." A sixth jailing occurred when Will Lewis,
manager of Los Angeles radio station KPFK, refused to provide a federal grand jury with
originals of a letter and a tape recording sent to him by radical groups claiming to have infor-
mation about the kidnapping of heiress Patty Hearst. GILLMOR ET AL., supra note 78, at 359.
Lewis spent 16 days in federal prison for contempt. Id. He disclosed the material after the
contempt conviction was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id.; see In re Lewis,
377 F. Supp. 297 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 913
(1975). Lewis raised a privilege claim under the First Amendment, and apparently did not
seek protection under the California shield law. See Lewis v. United States, 501 F.2d at 421.
240. See infra notes 301-26 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 117-34 and accompanying text.
242. See infra notes 269-79 and accompanying text.
243. 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
244. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b). See supra notes 164-74 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the shield law's incorporation into the California Constitution.
245. See infra note 324 for a discussion of the California Supreme Court's analysis of the
shield law's status as a constitutional provision.
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about how he obtained a written statement by a witness in the multiple-
murder trial of Charles Manson and his followers.246 Because the
sources were subject to a court-imposed gag order,247 the outcome did
not turn on the conflict between the newsgatherer's immunity and a
criminal defendant's right to evidence. Rather, a court of appeal cited
the trial court's duty to take reasonable measures to protect defendants
from the harmful effects of pretrial publicity.2 a" A gag order binding
court officers was an appropriate measure, and to enforce it a judge must
have the power to investigate violations of the order.24 9 The court held
that section 1070 of the Evidence Code was invalid under such circum-
stances because the legislature could not interfere with a court's "inher-
ent and vital power.., to control its own proceedings and officers." 2 '
246. Farr, 22 Cal. App. 3d at 64, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 344. Los Angeles Herald Examiner
reporter Bill Farr obtained three copies of the statement, which was made by a prosecution
witness who had not yet testified. Id. According to the statement, Manson follower Susan
Atkins had confessed to the killings, implicated Manson, and reported that the defendants had
planned to murder a series of celebrities, including Frank Sinatra and Elizabeth Taylor. Id.
247. The statement had been distributed by the prosecution to the defendants' attorneys.
Id. Farr later acknowledged that he had obtained copies of the statement from three people
subject to a court order prohibiting attorneys, court employees, attaches and witnesses from
releasing for public dissemination any information about testimony and evidence that might be
given in trial. Id. at 64-65, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 344. Farr invoked § 1070 of the Evidence Code
when the trial judge asked him to identify his sources, and the Los Angeles Herald Examiner
published a story based on the witness statement the next day. Id. at 65, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
Eighteen months later, after the Manson defendants were convicted and sentenced to
death, and after Farr had left the newspaper to become press secretary to the Los Angeles
County District Attorney, the trial judge held a hearing to determine who had released the
witness statement. Id. at 65, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 345. Farr again invoked § 1070, but the judge
held him in contempt and ordered him jailed for refusing to answer questions about the iden-
tity of his sources or the circumstances under which he obtained the statement. .d. at 66, 99
Cal. Rptr. at 345.
248. Id. at 72, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 350; see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966)
(holding that courts must take steps to prevent outside interferences from frustrating judicial
functions).
249. Farr, 22 Cal. App. 3d at 70, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
250. Id. at 69, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348. The trial court's contempt judgment was affirmed; Farr
was ordered to answer the questions. Id. at 73, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
Farr's petition for hearing by the state supreme court was denied. The United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari. 409 U.S. 1011 (1972). Subsequent habeas corpus proceed-
ings also were unsuccessful. See Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
427 U.S. 912 (1976); In re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974). Farr was
jailed for 48 days and was freed only after a judge determined that the reporter would never
name his source, no matter how long he was incarcerated. VAN GERPEN, supra note 76, at 23;
see In re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d at 584, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 653 (holding that commitment for
contempt must be limited to five days once court determines that indeterminate civil commit-
ment has become punitive, rather than coercive, in nature).
The appeal court in Farr v. Superior Court said it was unnecessary to decide whether
§ 1070 of the Evidence Code wa" available to ex-journalists like Farr. Farr, 22 Cal. App. 3d at
69, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 347-48. Nevertheless, the case sparked an amendment to § 1070 extending
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The rule was reiterated in Rosato v. Superior Court:251 again, a court
was seeking information for its own purposes, rather than enforcing a
subpoena from a criminal defendant. In Rosato, two reporters and two
editors at the Fresno Bee were held in contempt for refusing to answer
questions about the source of a sealed grand jury transcript.252 An appel-
late court held that the journalists were required to answer the vast ma-
jority of questions253 put to them at a special hearing to determine who
had violated the gag order and supplied them with the transcript.25 4 The
shield law had to yield to the court's right to conduct an investigation
aimed at ensuring a fair trial and disciplining those who violated the
court's orders.
255
In dicta, the Rosato court recognized a second exception to section
1070: newsgatherers could not refuse to testify about criminal activity
they observed or in which they participated.256 In all other respects, the
court said, the shield law was "absolute.
'257
The judicial departure from the plain language of section 1070 be-
came even more blatant in CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court.258 In that case, a
its protection to former newsgatherers. Ch. 1717, § 1, 1971 Cal. Stat. 3658 (codified as
amended at CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1991)); see Kevane, supra note 174, at 544
n.105.
251. 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
252. Id. at 198-99, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 432-33. The grand jury had indicted a Fresno city
councilman, a former city planning commissioner and a local land developer on charges of
bribery and conspiracy. Id. at 199, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 433. In addition to sealing the transcript
until after trial, the court issued an exhaustive gag order barring the attorneys, parties in the
case, and court and law enforcement employees from making statements outside court or re-
leasing documents or evidence. Id. at 200, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 433. Nevertheless, the Fresno Bee
ran stories on three consecutive days quoting extensively from the grand jury transcript. Id. at
201, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
253. The court said the questions must be limited to those directed toward determining
whether court officers supplied the transcript. Id. at 223-25, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 449-50. Ques-
tions about possible other sources were impermissible. Id. at 224, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 450. Certi-
orari was denied by the United States Supreme Court. 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
The reporters and editors, nicknamed the "Bee Four," continued to refuse to answer the
questions and were held in contempt. VAN GERPEN, supra note 76, at 26. They were jailed
for 15 days, until the trial court judge decided that further incarceration would not cause them
to reveal the source of the transcript. Id.; Goodale & Moodhe, supra note 13, at 494.
254. Rosato, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 231, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
255. Id. at 224, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
256. Id. at 218, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 446. The court based this conclusion on Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691-92 (1972) ("It would be frivolous to assert ... that the First Amend-
ment ... confers a license on either the reporter or his news sources to violate valid criminal
laws."), and on analogous limitations on legislative, executive, attorney-client, marital commu-
nications, physician-patient and psychotherapist-patient privileges. Rosato, 51 Cal. App. 3d at
219, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
257. Rosato, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 224, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
258. 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1978).
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court refused to recognize that the shield law created two separate cate-
gories of information subject to nondisclosure: (1) sources, and (2) un-
published inIormation.2 5 9 Instead, it injected a requirement of promised
confidentiality into the statute, engendering even more confusion over
the shield law's scope.2"°
The court of appeal focused on an agreement in which CBS prom-
ised not to broadcast videotape revealing the identities of sheriff's narcot-
ics investigators until their undercover mission had ended. 261  By taking
the witness stand, the court reasoned, the investigators "revealed their
identities and roles. Thus, the underlying purpose of the agreed confi-
dentiality was lost. '262  Absent a continuing confidential relationship
with a source, newsgatherers had no right to withhold unpublished infor-
mation.263 In other words, only confidential sources and information
were protected under the shield law.
This reasoning was repudiated early the following year by another
appellate court, in Hammarley v. Superior Court.21 A newspaper re-
porter, relying solely on section 1070 of the Evidence Code and not rais-
ing a First Amendment claim, 265 refused to testify or disclose resource
materials about a published interview.2 66 In contrast to CBS, Inc., the
Hammarley court relied on the plain language of the statute and rejected
259. Id. at 250, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
260. Id. In CBS, Inc, two men charged with selling the illegal drug PCP subpoenaed
videotapes made by the television network during meetings between the defendants and under-
cover Santa Clara County Sheriff's Department investigators. Id. at 246, 149 Cal. Rptr. at
423. Portions of the videotapes were used for the news program 60 Minutes. Id. Although
the defendants claimed the tapes were necessary to refresh the recollections of three detectives
involved in the investigation, CBS attorneys made a motion to quash the subpoena, which was
denied. Id. at 246-48, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 423-25.
261. Id. at 250, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
262. Id.
263. Id. The court stated:
Petitioner argues that, since the outtakes are unpublished, section 1070 ex-
pressly applies. The fact of their being unpublished, however, strikes us as not in
itself significant where, as here, the claimant of the privilege fails to explain what of
substance in the materials sought to be produced has not already been revealed.
Id.
264. 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979).
265. Id. at 395, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
266. Id. at 392-94, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 609-10. When Sacramento Union reporter John Ham-
marley invoked § 1070 in response to a subpoena for testimony and materials dealing with his
interviews with a former member of the Mexican Mafia prison gang, the trial court ruled that
the shield law was inapplicable because the source was not confidential. Id. at 394, 153 Cal.
Rptr. at 611. Hammarley's articles in the Union and in New West magazine contained state-
ments by the gang member implicating three men in a murder; in the ensuing criminal case,
the defendants sought information about the interviews in the hope of impeaching Ham-
marley's source, who had become a prosecution witness. Id. at 392-93, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 610-
11. When Hammarley refused to produce his tapes, notes and transcriptions for an in camera
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the trial court's requirement that the withheld evidence be confiden-
tial.267 Rather, "unpublished information is not limited to material
which might lead to the disclosure of a newsman's confidential sources,
but encompasses all information acquired... in the course of his profes-
sional activities which he has not disseminated to the public."26
b. when must the protection yield?
The CBS, Inc. and Hammarley decisions also were significant in the
development of a balancing test for courts faced with the conflicting de-
mands of a criminal defendant and a journalist withholding information
that falls within the shield law's scope. In discussing the network's quali-
fied First Amendment privilege claim,2 69 the CBS, Inc. court applied a
balance previously developed for criminal defendants who sought to
overcome prosecutorial privilege: a defendant is entitled to discovery if
he or she demonstrates a reasonable possibility the evidence sought might
result in the defendant's exoneration.270 In CBS, Inc., disclosure posed a
"tenuous restraint" for the network's newsgathering abilities, while non-
disclosure would have directly impaired the ability of the defendants to
get a fair trial.27
Nevertheless, because the CBS, Inc. court removed the television
outtakes from section 1070's scope, it was in Hammarley that a Califor-
nia appellate court was first forced to address a direct conflict between
the shield law and a criminal defendant's fair trial right.2 72 The notion
that section 1070 of the Evidence Code created a true privilege273 helped
review, the judge cited him for contempt and ordered him jailed. Id. at 394, 153 Cal. Rptr. at
611.
267. Id. at 397-98, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
268. Id. (emphasis added).
269. CBS, Inc., 85 Cal. App. 3d at 251-52, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 426. See supra notes 117-34
and accompanying text for a discussion of qualified First Amendment privilege.
270. CBS, Inc., 85 Cal. App. 3d at 251-52, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 426; see People v. Borunda, 11
Cal. 3d 523, 527, 522 P.2d 1, 3, 113 Cal. Rptr. 825, 827 (1974) (police must disclose identity of
confidential informant only when criminal "defendant demonstrates a reasonable possibility
that the anonymous informant... could give evidence on the issue of guilt which might result
in defendant's exoneration").
271. CBS, Inc., 85 Cal. App. 3d at 252, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 427. The trial court was ordered
to review the videotapes in camera to determine whether they contained evidence bearing on
the defendants' guilt or innocence, and whether disclosure of edited materials would fulfill the
defendants' needs while protecting the interests of the network and law enforcement. Id. at
253-54, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 428. Inexplicably, the court observed that in camera editing might
preserve "CBS's claimed pledge of secrecy," even though it previously stated that the confiden-
tiality was abrogated and no longer a factor in the analysis. Id. at 250, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
272. Hammarley, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 397-98, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
273. The Hammarley court referred to the shield law throughout the opinion as a "statu-
tory privilege" and cited "federal and state constitutional imperatives" as justification for a
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create a rule repeatedly cited 274 -that criminal defendants seeking infor-
mation falling within the scope of section 1070 must show that (1) the
evidence sought is relevant and necessary, (2) there is a reasonable possi-
bility the evidence might result in the defendant's exoneration, and (3)
the evidence is unavailable from alternative sources.275
The Hammarley court's expansive interpretation of section 1070's
scope276 and its strict three-prong test for abrogating the immunity be-
came the last word regarding the California shield law in the criminal
setting for eleven years, until Delaney.277 The Hammarley test ensured
that the shield would give way27 1 only when a criminal defendant
demonstrated that he or she needed the evidence to gain a fair trial and
that any prospective burden 'on newsgathering was "highly speculative
and uncertain.
'27 9
balancing test similar to that used by the CBS, Inc. court in analyzing First Amendment privi-
lege. See id. at 399, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
274. See Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1045, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 639; Playboy Enters. v.
Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 24-25, 201 Cal. Rptr. 207, 215 (1984).
275. Hammarley, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 399, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 614. Like the CBS, Inc. court,
the court in Hammarley turned to Borunda to find the exoneration requirement. Id.; see supra
note 270.
276. See supra notes 263-68 and accompanying text.
277. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 805-07, 789 P.2d at 945-47, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 764-76.
278. Because the defendants in Hammarley had met the test, disclosure was required.
Hammarley, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 402, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
The opposite result was reached under the same three-prong test in Hallissy v. Superior
Court. Erin Hallissy, a reporter for the Contra Costa Times, interviewed a man charged with
three murders and facing the possibility of the death penalty. Halissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at
1041, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36. After the Contra Costa Times published a story in which the
defendant said he had killed for pay, Hallissy's notes were sought by the defense. Id., 248 Cal.
Rptr. at 636. Defense lawyers argued that the materials were necessary to prove their client
had made inconsistent statements to a number of people, and his statements to Hallissy were
not credible. Id.
The court held that the defendant had "approache[d] an adequate showing of relevancy,"
but he had made no showing the sought-after material was necessary to his case. Id. at 1046,
248 Cal. Rptr. at 639. By conceding that he made confessions to other people, the defendant
failed to meet the requirements that there be no alternative sources and there was a reasonable
possibility the material might result in exoneration. Id.
279. Hammarley, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 402, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 616. While confidentiality was
not required to bring material within the ambit of § 1070, the court considered it relevant in
weighing the competing interests:
At stake here is defendants' right meaningfully to confront and cross-examine their
primary accuser with the benefit of all evidence reasonably available to challenge his
credibility. Petitioner's interest is in the vindication of a privilege not to disclose
unpublished information which here was freely volunteered with no pledge of confi-
dentiality asked or given and which only fortuitously falls within the literal scope of
section 1070 not because of a perceived need for confidentiality but because of the
vagaries of editorial judgment.
Id. at 401, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16.
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2. Delaney v. Superior Court's new balance
In contrast to its predecessor cases, where conflicts arose over the
refusal of journalists to testify about capital murder cases,28 0 government
misconduct281 or Pulitzer Prize-winning investigations,2 2 Delaney v. Su-
perior Court 283 was spawned by a routine newspaper story and a routine
arrest.284 No promises of confidentiality were made or even discussed.
2 5
Rather, Delaney involved the kind of gatekeeping2 6 decisions made
every day by reporters and editors that make articles readable in style
and length, and which are normally made without concern about the
possible demands of litigants. Here, editorially insignificant-but legally
crucial-information was left out of print.
It was the very routineness of the circumstances that tested the
parameters of the shield law and forced the California Supreme Court to
define the scope and application of article I, section 2(b) of the California
Constitution.
a. background
For an article about the formation of a Long Beach police task force
to combat downtown drug sales, thefts and panhandling, Los Angeles
Times reporter Roxana Kopetman and photographer Roberto Santiago
Bertero accompanied task force officers on patrol on September 23,
1987.287 At a shopping mall, officers spotted Sean Patrick Delaney and a
companion sitting on a bench.288 When the officers asked Delaney about
a plastic bag protruding from his shirt pocket, Delaney pulled out the
280. See Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1041, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36.
281. See Rosato, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 199, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
282. See Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 272, 690 P.2d 625, 627, 208 Cal. Rptr.
152, 154 (1984).
283. 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990).
284. Id. at 793, 789 P.2d at 937, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
285. See iL
286. "Gatekeeping" refers to the process by which reporters and editors make decisions
about what to cover, write or tape stories about, and publish or broadcast. This process of
selection, which determines what information becomes available to the public, has been stud-
ied extensively to determine how standardized it is among a variety of news media decision-
makers, and what factors influence their choices. Significant studies applying gatekeeping the-
ory include: G.A. Donohue et al., Structure and Constraints on Community Newspaper Gate-
keepers, 66 JOURNALISM Q. 807 (1989); David Manning White, The Gate-Keeper: A Case
Study in the Selection of News, 27 JOURNALISM Q. 383 (1949); D. Charles Whitney & Lee B.
Becker, 'Keeping the Gates'for Gatekeepers" The Effects of Wire News, 59 JouRNALIsM Q. 60
(1982).
287. Delaney v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. App. 3d 681, 685, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60, 61 (1988),
aff'd, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990).
288. Id.
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bag to reveal that it contained a piece of gold and an item of jewelry,
which Delaney said he intended to pawn at the mall.2 89
The officers' suspicions were aroused because there were no pawn
shops in the mall; they asked for Delaney's identification, and Delaney
reached for his jacket on the bench.290 The officers later testified that
they asked to check the jacket before Delaney picked it up, and that De-
laney consented.29' One of the officers found a set of brass knuckles in-
side the jacket.292
Four days later, the Los Angeles Times published an article about
the downtown task force that mentioned the police contact with Dela-
ney.29 3 It included a photograph of Delaney and his companion on the
mall bench, but it did not state whether Delaney consented to the
search.294
Delaney, meanwhile, was charged with possession of brass knuckles,
a misdemeanor.295 Contending that he had not consented to the jacket
search, Delaney moved to suppress evidence of the brass knuckles and
subpoenaed Kopetman and Bertero to testify at the suppression hearing
in municipal court.2 96 After the court denied the journalists' motions to
quash the subpoenas, Kopetman and Bertero were called to the stand by
the prosecutor. They confirmed information included in the article-
that they had, in fact, witnessed the search.297 But they cited article I,
section 2(b) of the California Constitution, section 1070 of the Evidence
Code and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and
refused to answer questions about unpublished information, including
whether Delaney had consented to the search.298 Kopetman and Bertero
289. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 793, 789 P.2d at 937, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Delaney, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 685, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
294. Id.
295. Id.; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 12020(a) (West Supp. 1991).
296. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 793-94, 789 P.2d at 937, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
297. Opening Brief on the Merits for Real Parties in Interest at 3, Delaney v. Superior
Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934 (1990) (No. S006866).
298. Id. Kopetman believed that her independence as a reporter would be compromised if
she testified. Roxana Kopetman, Notebooks--Not Toothbrushes, STATEWIDE BENCH/BAR/
MEDIA NEWSLETTER (State Bar of California), June 1988, at 1. She later explained her
reasoning:
While I can sympathize with the prosecutor and the public defender, the greater
good in this case unquestionably is served by opposing such pressure. To testify
would send a message to sources and others that reporters can and will become wit-
nesses in criminal or civil actions-a message that would irreparably harm the pub-
lic's perception of the press as an objective provider of information. Such a message
could also dry up our sources and discourage our aggressive reporting if now, all of a
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were cited for contempt.299 They immediately petitioned for writs of
habeas corpus.o
b. scope of the shield law
In Delaney, the California Supreme Court endorsed a broad inter-
pretation of the types of information that can be withheld by journalists
in the face of a subpoena and the threat of contempt. °1 In doing so, the
state high court rejected the reasoning of CBS, Inc. and Liggett v. Supe-
rior Court,3"2 where appellate courts had determined that "unpublished
information" could be withheld under the shield law only if it were main-
sudden, the inevitable consequence of our reporting is to be forced to testify in court
cases.
Id. at 1, 3.
299. Chris Woodyard, Times Reporter Held in Jail for 6 Hours, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 10, 1987,
at 38. The judge ordered Kopetman immediately jailed during the hearing December 9, 1987,
and fined her $100 per day, up to a maximum $1000, until such time as she agreed to answer
the prosecutor's questions. Id. Kopetman remained in custody until late that evening, after
counsel for the Los Angeles Times filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in superior court.
Id. The writ was issued pending a full hearing. Brief of Real Parties in Interest at 3-4, Dela-
ney (No. S006866). On December 10, 1987, Bertero was held in contempt after he, too, re-
fused to answer questions, but he was not jailed in light of the superior court's action regarding
Kopetman's writ. Id. at 4. A writ of habeas corpus subsequently was fied in superior court
on Bertero's behalf. Id.
300. Kopetman and Bertero petitioned the superior court, which granted writs of habeas
corpus quashing the contempt citations. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 794, 789 P.2d at 937-38, 268
Cal. Rptr. at 756-57. Delaney and the Long Beach City Prosecutor ified a joint petition for
writ of mandate in the court of appeal, which was granted, and the contempt citations were
reinstated. Id. at 794, 789 P.2d at 938, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
Although the court of appeal was affirmed by the California Supreme Court, the lower
court's decision is worthy of separate discussion because it used a very different analysis than
the supreme court. The appellate court chose to avoid a conflict of rights that would require a
balancing test by limiting the shield law's scope to those situations in which "trust [has been]
placed in the newsperson." Delaney, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 691, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 62. The
appellate court reasoned that the shield law's purpose was to protect journalists who, to gather
news, must promise either to not identify the source of information or to publish only some of
the information provided by the source. Id. at 689, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 65-66. The court found
support for this conclusion in a state senate committee analysis prepared during consideration
of the 1974 amendment extending § 1070 of the Evidence Code to include unpublished infor-
mation and a ballot argument in support of Proposition 5. Id.; see infra notes 311 & 316.
Both emphasized the need to keep journalists who honor pledges of confidentiality out of jail.
Delaney, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 689-90, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 64-65.
Requiring confidentiality removes from shield law protection eyewitness observations at a
public event. Therefore, the court of appeal reasoned, a journalist must testify about the event
as would any other citizen. Id. at 691, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
301. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 805, 789 P.2d at 945, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 764.
302. 224 Cal. App. 3d 426,260 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1989), vacated, 800 P.2d 516,275 Cal. Rptr.
160 (Cal. 1990).
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tained under a promise of confidentiality. 03
Writing for a unanimous California Supreme Court,3" Justice
Eagleson observed that article I, section 2(b) of the California Constitu-
tion305 protects journalists from being held in contempt for refusing to
disclose either of two separate and independent types of information:
(1) unpublished information, or (2) the source of information, whether
published or unpublished. 3 6 The language of the shield law was "clear
and unambiguous" 3 0 -- "any unpublished information" was the
equivalent of all information. 30 8 Furthermore, article I, section 2(b) pro-
vided an explicit, broad definition of unpublished information unqualified
by any requirement of confidentiality. 3°9 Thus, unpublished information
was not restricted to information obtained by a journalist under a prom-
ise of confidence.31 0
The legislative history of section 1070, relied on by courts that de-
manded a threshold showing of confidentiality,311 was "beside the point"
because the unambiguous language of article I, section 2(b) and section
1070 made judicial construction unnecessary. 312 Moreover, Justice Ea-
gleson wrote, it was the voters' intent in passing Proposition 5, and not
that of the legislature, that counted,313 and legislative materials had not
303. See id at 443, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 171-72; CBS, Inc., 85 Cal. App. 3d at 250, 149 Cal.
Rptr. at 426; see also Delaney, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 691, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 65-66.
304. Justices Mask and Broussard wrote separate concurring opinions. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d
at 817, 789 P.2d at 954, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 773 (Mask, J., concurring); 50 Cal. 3d at 822, 789
P.2d at 958, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 777 (Broussard, J., concurring).
305. The California Supreme Court limited its discussion and holding to art. I, § 2(b) be-
cause incorporation of the provision into the California Constitution "effectively moot[ed]"
§ 1070 of the Evidence Code. Id. at 800 n.11,789 P.2d at 942 n.1 1, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 761 n.1 1.
306. Id. at 796-97, 789 P.2d at 939, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 758.
307. Id. at 798, 789 P.2d at 940, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 759.
308. Id., 789 P.2d at 941, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 760.
309. Id. at 799, 789 P.2d at 941, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 760.
310. Id. at 800, 789 P.2d at 941, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 760.
311. See, for example, Delaney, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 689, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 65-66, which
relied on an analysis by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary of the 1974 amendment that
extended § 1070 of the Evidence Code to "unpublished information." Ch. 1456, § 2, 1974 Cal.
Stat. 3184 (codified at CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1991)). The analysis empha-
sized, but did not require, conrfidentiality:
The problem that gives rise to this legislation is that ... reporters... often are given
information by individuals purely as background information to aid the reporter's
understanding of the subject. In addition, investigative reporters who conduct de-
tailed research and investigations into a subject generally use only a fraction of what
they learn in an actual publication. It is this background information and the sources
of it which are presently unprotected.
CALIFORNIA SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF SEN. BILL 1858 (1974) (em-
phasis in original).
312. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 800, 789 P.2d at 942, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 761.
313. Id.
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been presented to the voters when they elected to copy section 1070 into
the state constitution. 1 4
Instead, the supreme court looked to the ballot materials distributed
to voters, since these were relevant in deciding whether voters intended
something different than Proposition 5's actual result.3 15 The ballot ar-
gument by initiative supporters316 and the summary by the Legislative
Analyst3 17 stressed the shield law's protection of confidential newsgather-
ing relationships. However, the court found that these statements did
not limit the scope of article I, section 2(b) because they did not state that
only confidential matters fell within the law's protection. 313  Emphasiz-
ing one of the provision's purposes did not make that goal the provision's
sole purpose, the court reasoned.31 9 Furthermore, an inference from the
ballot materials could not overcome the unrestricted and facially clear
language of the statute.320
By rejecting section 1070's legislative history and the Proposition 5
314. Id. at 800-01, 789 P.2d at 942, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 761.
315. Id. at 802, 789 P.2d at 943, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 762.
316. The ballot argument stated, in part:
Tihe use of confidential sources is critical to the gathering of news....
This amendment merely places into the state's Constitution protection already
afforded journalists by statute. That law, enacted in 1935, in clear and straightfor-
ward language, provides that reporters cannot be held in contempt of court for refus-
ing to reveal confidential sources of information. At least six reporters in California
in recent years have spent time in jail rather than disclose their sources to a judge.
By giving existing law constitutional status, judges will have to give the protection
greater weight before attempting to compel reporters to breach their pledges of confi-
dentiality.
... In most cases, a reporter is able to reveal corruption and malfeasance within
government only with the help of an honest employee. If such an individual feels
that a reporter's pledge of confidentiality may be broken under the threat of jail, that
person simply will not come forward with his or her information.
T'o'jail a journalist because he protected his source is an assault not only on the
press but on all Californians as well.
CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, PRIMARY ELECTIbN JUNE 3, 1980, at 19 (Argument in
Favor of Proposition 5).
317. The Legislative Analyst's statement provided:
Since 1935, laws enacted by the California Legislature have protected the confi-
dential information sources of persons employed by or connected with the news me-
dia. The law provides that such persons may not be held in contempt. . . for refusing
to (1) disclose the source of any information obtained by them for publication, or (2)
reveal any unpublished information obtained in the preparation of a news story.
This" measure would place in the California Constitution provisions of existing
law enacted by the Legislature to protect news sources, thereby granting a state con-
stitutional protection for these rights.
Id. at 18 (Analysis by Legislative Analyst) (emphasis in original).
318. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 802-03, 789 P.2d at 943-44, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 762-63.
319. Id.
320. Id.
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ballot argument as interpretive guides for article I, section 2(b), the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court endorsed the broad scope holdings in Playboy En-
terprises v. Superior Court321 and Hammarley322 and knocked the legs
from under the appeal court's decision in Delaney and the earlier Liggett
and CBS, Inc. rulings. The Liggett and CBS, Inc. courts "paid insuffi-
cient attention to the shield law's language. '323 The Farr and Rosato
decisions, which had limited the scope of the statutory shield law, were
swept away by the supreme court in a footnote.324
In sum, the Delaney court concluded that nonparty witness journal-
ists need not show that the information they withhold in court was
gained under a promise of confidentiality. 325 Therefore, undisseminated
eyewitness observations by newsgatherers in a public place fell within the
sphere of "unpublished information" protected by the shield law.326
321. 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 201 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1984).
322. Both courts held that "unpublished information," as used in the shield law, included
all information collected by newsgatherers but not disseminated to the public, whether or not
the information was gained under a promise of confidentiality. Playboy Enters., 154 Cal. App.
3d at 22-23, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 214-15; Hammarley, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 397-98, 153 Cal. Rptr.
at 612-13.
323. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 803-04, 789 P.2d at 944-45, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 763-64.
324. Id. at 803 n. 15, 789 P.2d at 944 n. 15, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 763 n. 15. The Farr and Rosato
courts found the statutory shield law, § 1070 of the Evidence Code, to be an unconstitutional
legislative interference with judicial power to hold parties in contempt for failing to answer
questions about violations of court orders. Farr, 22 Cal. App. 3d at 69, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348;
Rosato, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 219, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 446-47. Some observers felt that placing the
measure into the California Constitution eliminated separation of powers as a basis for limiting
the shield law's application, see Richard A. Sipos, Comment, California's "New" Newsmen's
Shield Law and the Criminal Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 219,
238 (1986); Kevane, supra note 174, at 546, but the effect of constitutionalizing the shield law
was not addressed by the California Supreme Court until Delaney. It follows from the court's
holding that art. I, § 2(b) of the California Constitution mooted § 1070 of the Evidence Code
that the shield law's failings because of its statutory status, such as that recognized in Farr and
Rosato, are also mooted. See supra notes 243-55 and accompanying text. The court suggested
as much when it observed that § 1070 would run afoul of separation of powers doctrines only
if it went beyond the scope of art. I, § 2(b):
We requested the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the issue of whether sec-
tion 1070 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the California judiciary's inherent
power to punish contempt. Because the scope of section 1070 is rendered moot as a
practical matter by our construction of article 1, section 2(b). ... we need not and do
not decide this issue, which would arise only if section 1070 were amended so that it
were somehow broader than article I, section 2(b).
Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 803 n.15, 789 P.2d at 944 n.15, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 763 n.15.
325. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 805, 789 P.2d at 945, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 764. This holding was
extended to civil proceedings in which the journalist is a nonparty witness in New York Times
Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 453, 461-62, 796 P.2d 811, 816, 273 Cal. Rptr. 98, 103
(1990). See supra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
326. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 805, 789 P.2d at 945, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 764.
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c. conflicting fair trial right
What the California Supreme Court gave journalists in Delaney it
made very easy for criminal defendants to take away. By accepting the
shield law's facially broad language, the court opened a huge umbrella of
protection for information collected in journalists' memories, notes and
source documents. Nevertheless, by ignoring First Amendment princi-
ples and the reasoning of the federal courts, the state high court made the
Delaney umbrella a porous one indeed.
Qualified First Amendment newsgathering privilege had been incor-
porated into California law long before Delaney. The state supreme
court had explicitly recognized the privilege in the context of defamation
lawsuits, 27 and California courts confronted with a conflict between a
criminal defendant's subpoena and a journalist's invocation of the shield
law had relied for a decade on the First Amendment-based three-prong
test employed in Hammarley.25 These requirements provided a crucial
safeguard against defendants' subpoenas and allowed journalists to keep
their promises and retain their unpublished work product.3 29
Yet, in crafting its own balancing test for fair trial disputes, the
Delaney court removed two significant, mandatory hurdles adopted by
the federal and state courts, downgrading both to "factors" a judge
should consider in weighing a journalist's immunity claim: the evidence
sought must be (1) crucial to determining the outcome of the case,33 0 and
(2) unavailable elsewhere.3 31 The California Supreme Court also added
to the balancing test the same judicial gloss it had just removed in adopt-
327. Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 284, 690 P.2d at 635, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
328. Hammarley, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 399, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 614. Hammarley required
criminal defendants seeking to overcome a claim of immunity under the shield law to show
that the evidence sought is (1) relevant and necessary, (2) likely to result in the defendant's
exoneration, and (3) is unavailable from other sources. Id.; see supra notes 272-79 and accom-
panying text.
The vast majority of federal courts have required parties seeking information from jour-
nalists to show that the evidence is (1) highly material and relevant, (2) goes to the heart of the
claim, and (3) is unavailable from other sources. See supra notes 117-34 and accompanying
text.
The federal "heart of the claim" element, applicable to all types of litigation, is compara-
ble to the criminal "exoneration" requirement of Hammarley. "Heart of the claim," like guilt
or innocence, is a method of determining whether the evidence is central to the determination
of the entire case. See supra note 122; Brief of Real Parties in Interest at 29-30, Delaney (No.
S006866).
329. See, ag., Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1046, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 639 (murder defendant
seeking reporter's testimony to show defendant made inconsistent statements able to get simi-
lar testimony from other sources).
330. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 808-09, 789 P.2d at 948, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
331. Id. at 812, 789 P.2d at 951, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
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ing an expansive view of the shield law's scope: henceforth, lesser protec-
tion would be accorded nonconfidential information332 and eyewitness
observations.333
Justice Eagleson launched the court's discussion of the fair trial-
shield law conffict with the premise that "the shield law's protection is
overcome in a criminal proceeding on a showing that nondisclosure
would deprive a defendant of his federal constitutional right to a fair
trial. ' 334 The defendant's paramount right was unaffected by the shield
law's incorporation into the state constitution.335 The issue, then, was
what showing a criminal defendant must make to compel disclosure of
information once a journalist convinces a court that the information be-
ing withheld falls within the shield law's scope.336
The state supreme court held that a criminal defendant need only
show that there was a reasonable possibility the information sought
would materially assist his or her defense.337 The evidence need not lead
to acquittal or dismissal of the charges; disclosure could be ordered if a
journalist's information might help a defendant avoid a more serious con-
viction in favor of a lesser charge, or impeach a prosecution witness, or
provide mitigating evidence in the penalty phase of a capital murder
trial.338 The court reasoned that these aspects were included within a
defendant's fair trial right.339 Requiring that the evidence go to the
"heart of the case," as the supreme court had done in defamation
suits, 31  was unworkable because it forced a trial court to "attempt to
divine" whether the information sought would cause a jury to acquit the
defendant.341 "A court [could not] be expected to have that degree of
prescience.
' 342
The Delaney court also rejected a second standard required in the
332. Id. at 810, 789 P.2d at 949, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
333. Id. at 812, 789 P.2d at 951, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
334. Id. at 805, 789 P.2d at 946, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
335. Id. at 805-06, 789 P.2d at 946, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 765. Citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,
480 U.S. 39 (1987), the court observed that Delaney's fair trial right probably was grounded on
the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, since a plurality of the United
States Supreme Court found that the confrontation and compulsory process clauses of the
Sixth Amendment did not apply to pretrial discovery. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 805 n.18, 789
P.2d at 946 n.18, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 765 n.18.
336. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 806 & n.20, 789 P.2d at 946 & n.20, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 765 &
n.20.
337. Id. at 808-09, 789 P.2d at 948, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
338. Id. at 809, 789 P.2d at 948-49, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 767-68.
339. Id. at 809, 789 P.2d at 949, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
340. See Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 280, 690 P.2d at 632, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
341. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 808-09, 789 P.2d at 948, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
342. Id. at 809, 789 P.2d at 948-49, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 767-68.
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defamation context:343 no longer must the party seeking to overcome the
shield exhaust all alternative sources for the needed information. 344 The
court reasoned that the requirement was unnecessary for information not
confidential or sensitive, 45 even though alternative sources for such evi-
dence seemingly would be more readily available. 3 " Furthermore, cer-
tain types of evidence never have alternative sources. 3 7 While objective
information, such as the contents of a document, might be available else-
where, percipient observations of events are unique.348  Even if multiple
witnesses could offer substantially similar testimony, a particular witness
might have greater credibility in court.3 49
A trial court's determination that there is a reasonable possibility
the information sought might materially assist the defense could not end
its analysis, however.35 0 A judge must go on to consider the importance
of protecting the information by balancing the interests of the defendant
and the newsgatherer 3ss In the Delaney court's eyes, the new test recog-
nized journalists' rights under article I, section 2(b) and made it possible
for a journalist to withhold information even after a defendant met the
threshold test.352 Factors to be balanced are: (1) whether the unpub-
lished information is confidential or sensitive; (2) what interests are being
protected by use of the shield law; (3) how important the information is
to the defendant; and (4) whether there are alternative sources for the
information. 53
First, a court must consider whether the information was gained in
confidence or, if not, whether it is "sensitive"-that is, whether "its dis-
closure would somehow unduly restrict the newsperson's access to future
sources and information. ' 354 Other information is less deserving of pro-
343. Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 282, 690 P.2d at 634, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
344. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 811-13, 789 P.2d at 950-51, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 769-70.
345. Id. at 812, 789 P.2d at 950, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 769; see infra notes 354-55 and accompa-
nying text. The court did not explain why the hurdle should be abandoned for defendants
seeking other information. See Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 812, 789 P.2d at 950, 268 Cal. Rptr. at
769.
346. See Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 811-12, 789 P.2d at 950, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
347. Id. at 812, 789 P.2d at 951, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 809, 789 P.2d at 949, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 809 n.24, 789 P.2d at 949 n.24, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768 n.24.
353. Id. at 809-13, 789 P.2d at 949-51, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768-70.
354. Id. at 810, 789 P.2d at 949, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768. The creation of a separate category
of "sensitive information" was perhaps well-intentioned, but the following example provided
by Justice Eagleson may be seized upon by trial courts to severely limit the category. A city
employee, who agrees to be identified, provides information to a reporter investigating corrup-
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tection, since the shield law's primary purpose is to protect the ability to
gather news.355
Second, a court must consider the "interests sought to be pro-
tected"-in other words, why the journalist is withholding the informa-
tion, and whether that reason might be moot under the circumstances.3 56
Justice Eagleson offered as an example a criminal defendant's attempt to
compel disclosure when the defendant has been the source of the infor-
mation.357 The factor was otherwise characterized only as a determina-
tion of whether the policy of the shield law would be thwarted by
disclosure.358
tion in city government, but the information is not published by the time the reporter is sub-
poenaed to testify. Id. at 810 n.25, 789 P.2d at 949 n.25, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768 n.25.
Disclosing the information might cause the source to be fired and convince other sources to
stop cooperating with the reporter. Id.
Such an example only confuses the need of journalists to protect information with the
need to protect sources. A better example, and a situation that often arises with newspaper
reporters, occurs when a reporter is assigned to a particular beat such as city hall, the police
department, or the courthouse, or to a long-running controversy, such as abortion rights or the
drug epidemic, and develops behind-the-scenes knowledge that comes with extended dealings
with the people involved. A trusting relationship develops between the reporter and these
sources and the reporter gains information without making an explicit promise of confidential-
ity. This might involve plans for an anti-abortion protest, or the policies of the district attor-
ney's office in seeking death sentences in murder cases, or even the sexual relations of public
figures and officials. For a variety of editorial reasons-ethics, concern about libel, or strat-
egy-the information is not published. The sources are not confidential, and the information
was not gained under a promise that it would remain confidential. However, such information
should be considered "sensitive" and deserving of special consideration because disclosing it is
certain to destroy the ability of that reporter-and possibly the newspaper's entire staff-to
continue the relationship that generated the information. Other information of great impor-
tance to the newspaper's readers will be difficult to obtain because the sources will consider
them untrustworthy, or at a minimum no longer unbiased observers, a status crucial to effec-
tive newsgathering.
For a discussion regarding the unspoken trust that often develops between reporters and
their sources, see Blasi, supra note 48, at 240-43.
355. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 810, 789 P.2d at 949, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
356. Id. at 810-11, 789 P.2d at 949-50, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768-69.
357. The court reasoned that if a defendant seeks disclosure of information that the defend-
ant provided, the need to avoid disclosure would be rendered moot and disclosure would not
prejudice a reporter's newsgathering ability. Id. at 810, 789 P.2d at 950, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
The state supreme court thus disapproved of the appellate court's decision in Hallissy, 200 Cal.
App. 3d 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635, allowing a reporter in this situation to withhold informa-
tion. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 810 n.27, 789 P.2d at 950 n.27, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 769 n.27.
358. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 810 n.27, 789 P.2d at 950 n.27, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 769 n.27. Such
reasoning ignores the fact that the journalist, not the source, holds the immunity, and the
interest the journalist seeks to protect might extend far beyond the relationship that journalist
has with that particular source. Rather, the journalist invoking the shield law may be seeking
to protect the profession's interest in a reputation of trustworthiness. See KLAIDMAN &
BEAUCHAMP, supra note 54, at 154-55, 176. Trust is a crucial element in all reporter-source
relationships: reporters trust sources to tell them the truth, and sources trust reporters to
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Third, a court should consider whether the defendant exceeded the
"reasonable possibility" requirement, and whether the information
sought would go to the "heart," or be dispositive, of the case.35 9 In such
situations, the balance would tip in favor of disclosure.36"
Finally, a court should consider whether there are alternative
sources for the information sought.361 In deciding whether to require
exhaustion of other sources, the court must evaluate the type of informa-
tion being sought, the quality of the alternative sources, and the practi-
cality of getting the information elsewhere.362
The weight of each of these four factors must be determined case by
case.363 In some cases, the court noted, one factor might "be so compel-
ling as to outweigh all the others.' '36"
Applying its test to the facts at hand, the California Supreme Court
held that Delaney clearly was entitled to the testimony of Kopetman and
Bertero.365 Since the police had no probable cause to search Delaney's
jacket, the question of whether Delaney consented, and thus whether the
brass knuckles were inadmissible evidence because they had been seized
illegally, would determine whether Delaney could be convicted of the
criminal charge.366 Therefore, a reasonable possibility existed that the
Times journalists' testimony would materially assist Delaney in his
defense.367
Not surprisingly, the balancing test also weighed "overwhelmingly"
against the journalists.368 Their observations in a public place were not
confidential or sensitive.369 Disclosure would not damage their ability to
accurately convey the information provided by the source and to keep confidences. Id. at 162.
Forcing a journalist to breach a promise or disclose information that will threaten long-term
relationships with sources is likely to make other sources hesitate to cooperate with all journal-
ists. See id at 164.
359. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 811, 789 P.2d at 950, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 811-13, 789 P.2d at 950-51, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 769-70.
362. Id. at 812-13, 789 P.2d at 951, 268 Cal. Rptr at 770.
363. Id. at 813, 789 P.2d at 951, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
364. Id. The court also stated that an in camera hearing, in which the trial court would
review and possibly limit disclosure of the information, would be appropriate only if the jour-
nalist invoking the shield law made a legitimate claim that the information sought was confi-
dential or sensitive. Id. at 814, 789 P.2d at 952, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 815, 789 P.2d at 953, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
367. Id. at 814-15, 789 P.2d at 952, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 771. The court noted that Delaney
also could have met the "heart of the case" requirement proposed by Kopetman and Bertero.
Id.
368. Id. at 815, 789 P.2d at 953, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
369. Id.
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gather news.37 ° The information was so important to the defendant that
it was likely to determine the outcome of the case.371 No meaningful
alternative source was available because the police officers and Delaney's
companion could not offer the disinterested testimony that could be pro-
vided by the journalists.372
The municipal court had "struck the correct balance," according to
the California Supreme Court.373 Kopetman and Bertero had to "accept
the civic responsibility imposed on all persons who witness alleged crimi-
nal conduct"374 and testify. The court of appeal was affirmed 375 and the
370. Id. The court reasoned that since both Delaney and the prosecution were seeking the
journalists' testimony, "it cannot be said the parties or anyone else would be reluctant to pro-
vide these reporters with future information based on a belief that the reporters had breached a
confidence or divulged sensitive information." Id. By focusing on the parties in the case at
hand, the court underestimated the broad impact on newsgathering when journalists testify.
See supra note 354 & infra notes 422-49 and accompanying text.
371. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 815, 789 P.2d at 953, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
372. Id. at 815-16, 789 P.2d at 953, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
373. Id. at 816, 789 P.2d at 953, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
374. Id.
375. Justices Panelli, Kennard and Kremer, a justice on the California Court of Appeal,
joined in Justice Eagleson's majority opinion. Id. at 817, 789 P.2d at 954, 268 Cal. Rptr. at
773. Chief Justice Lucas concurred in the portion of the majority opinion that discussed the
competing rights of Delaney and the press and crafted a balancing test. Id.
Justice Mosk wrote a separate concurring opinion rejecting the majority's balancing test
and arguing that a court should not inquire into the value of the information withheld by a
reporter once it is determined the information falls within the protection of art. I, § 2(b) of the
California Constitution. Id. at 817-18 & n.1, 789 P.2d at 954-55 & n.1, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 773-
74 & n.1 (Mosk, J., concurring). A court should require the defendant to show there are no
alternative sources for the information; only then should the shield be "pierced." Id. at 821,
789 P.2d at 957, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 776 (Mosk, J., concurring). This requirement preserves
press autonomy while accommodating a defendant's fair trial right. Id. (Mosk, J., concur-
ring). Because testimony of an eyewitness cannot be duplicated, and because Kopetman and
Bertero were precipient witnesses to the search, Delaney was entitled to their testimony. Id. at
822, 789 P.2d at 957-58, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 776-77 (Mosk, J., concurring).
Justice Broussard wrote a separate concurring opinion wherein he argued that statutory
antecedents should be used in interpreting a related initiative. Id. at 822-23, 789 P.2d at 958,
268 Cal. Rptr. at 777 (Broussard, J., concurring). Nevertheless, he concluded that the history
of § 1070 of the Evidence Code supported the conclusion that nonconfidential information fell
within the scope of art. I, § 2(b) of the California Constitution. Id. at 823, 789 P.2d at 958,
268 Cal. Rptr. at 777 (Broussard, J., concurring). Chief Justice Lucas joined in this portion of
the concurring opinion. Id. at 825, 789 P.2d at 960, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 779 (Broussard, J.,
concurring). Justice Broussard went on to advocate a balancing test under which a criminal
defendant first must show that the unpublished information he seeks would be "of some assist-
ance" and no alternative sources are available. Id., 789 P.2d at 959, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 778
(Broussard, J., concurring). Even after this showing, however, a court should deny access if it
"finds that the defendant's need for the information is not particularly great while the state's
interest in affording a reporter immunity under the circumstances is compelling." Id. No
such compelling interest was present in Delaney, Justice Broussard concluded. Id., 789 P.2d
at 960, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 779 (Broussard, J., concurring).
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petitions for writs of habeas corpus were denied.376
D. Other Problems
Developments since Delaney v. Superior Court 377 continue to high-
light the shield law's failings. By strictly limiting the law's protection to
contempt proceedings,3 71 the California Supreme Court has opened the
door to other, more obscure sanctions that serve the same punitive func-
tion as contempt yet may fall outside the scope of a court's contempt
power.379 Whether these sanctions will prove effective for litigants and
judges seeking testimony from journalists who are nonparty witnesses is
unclear.
In New York Times Co. v. Superior Court,38 ° the state supreme court
held that the shield law does not preclude litigants from using a statute
that permits recovery, through a separate civil action, of $500 plus actual
damages from any witness who disobeys a subpoena.381 The court rea-
soned that the enactment of the shield law did not implicitly repeal the
statute because article I, section 2(b) simply prohibited holding news-
376. Id. at 817, 789 P.2d at 954, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 773. Kopetman and Bertero returned to
Long Beach Municipal Court on August 7, 1990, and the suppression hearing was resumed.
Telephone Interview with Glen A. Smith, Senior Staff Counsel, The Times Mirror Co. (July
24, 1991). Kopetman testified that she did not remember any question by the police officers
seeking permission to search Delaney's jacket. Id. Bertero testified that he recalled only that
an officer asked Delaney if the jacket was his before it was searched. Id. At the conclusion of
the hearing, Judge Elvira S. Austin ruled that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to
even question Delaney, suppressed the brass knuckles and dismissed the charge. Id. The jour-
nalists' testimony therefore was irrelevant to the disposition of Delaney's case.
377. 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990).
378. Id. at 797 n.6, 789 P.2d at 939 n.6, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 758 n.6.
379. The Mitchell v. Superior Court holding that qualified First Amendment privilege is
available when newsgatherers are threatened with sanctions other than contempt should apply
to these punitive measures. See Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 279, 690 P.2d 625,
632, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152, 159 (1984). However, neither the California Supreme Court in New
York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 453, 796 P.2d 811, 273 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1990), nor
the trial court in People v. Powell, No. BA 035498 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County, May 30,
1991), addressed the Mitchell qualified privilege balancing test. The decisions in New York
Times Co. and Powell are discussed infra at notes 380-89 and accompanying text. See supra
notes 198-208 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Mitchell test.
380. 51 Cal. 3d 453, 796 P.2d 811, 273 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1990). See supra notes 226-31 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the facts of New York Times Co. and the court's holding
regarding the shield law's protection of nonparty journalists subject to contempt.
381. New York Times Co., 51 Cal. 3d at 464, 796 P.2d at 818, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 105; CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 1992 (West 1983). Section 1992 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
provides that "[a] witness disobeying a subpoena also forfeits to the party aggrieved the sum of
five hundred dollars ($500), and all damages which he may sustain by the failure of the witness
to attend, which forfeiture and damages may be recovered in a civil action." CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1992.
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gatherers in contempt.38 2 To extend the shield law's protections for non-
party journalists to other sanctions "would blur the distinction between a
privilege and an immunity, a distinction expressly declared by the Legis-
lature and adopted by the voters. '383
The court brushed off the newspaper's argument that the civil pen-
alty frustrated the purpose of the shield law.384 The sanction was "virtu-
ally ineffectual" because litigants unhappy about uncooperative reporter
witnesses would be unlikely to file a separate civil suit to recover just
$500, and it is "doubtful that a litigant could prove substantial damages
as a result of a newsperson's refusal to provide discovery. ' 385
While the state supreme court considered the availability of the civil
penalty in New York Times Co. to be "largely academic, ' 386 its lack of
concern about the shield law's purpose may encourage courts and liti-
gants to punish newsgatherers in other ways. Relying on New York
Times Co., a trial judge recently fined a newspaper reporter $1500 for
defying the court and refusing to identify the person who had supplied
the reporter with a police internal affairs report that was subject to a gag
order.387 The judge threatened to impose another $1500 fine each day
382. New York Times Co., 51 Cal. 3d at 463, 796 P.2d at 817, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 104; see
CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 2(b); CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1991).
383. New York Times Co., 51 Cal. 3d at 463, 796 P.2d at 817, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 104 (cita-
tions omitted). See supra notes 191-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinc-
tion between a privilege, which prohibits all sanctions, and an immunity from contempt.
384. New York Times Co., 51 Cal. 3d at 463-64, 796 P.2d at 817-18, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 104-
05.
385. Id. at 464, 796 P.2d at 817-18, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 104-05. The court noted that it had
found only four reported decisions involving § 1992 in the 118 years since its enactment. Id.,
796 P.2d at 818, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 105. "The simple economics of modem litigation essentially
preclude such an action." Id.
Neither litigant in the underlying lawsuit filed a § 1992 action after the New York Times
Co. ruling. Telephone Interview with C. Michael Cooney of Price, Postel & Parma, Counsel
for the New York Times Co. (Aug. 22, 1991).
386. New York Times Co., 51 Cal. 3d at 464, 796 P.2d at 817, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
387. Lois Timnick, Times Reporter Refuses to Tell Source, Is Fined, L.A. TIMES, May 31,
1991, at Al. A Los Angeles Times reporter, Richard A. Serrano, had written an article report-
ing that he had obtained a copy of a 314-page Los Angeles Police Department report on the
internal affairs investigation into the much-publicized videotaped beating of motorist Rodney
King by police officers. Richard A. Serrano, 3 in King Beating Say They Feared for Lives, L.A.
TiMES, May 21, 1991, at Al. The report had been sealed by the judge presiding over criminal
charges against four officers accused of assaulting King. Timnick, supra, at Al, A28; see Peo-
ple v. Powell, No. BA 035498 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County, Apr. 30, 1991) (order sealing
defendants' personnel records).
In an effort to identify who had violated his order by disclosing the report, the judge asked
Serrano if he had obtained the report from any person subject to the order and, if so, who that
person was. Record at 21, People v. Powell, No. BA 035498 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County,
May 30, 1991). Serrano refused to answer. Id. The judge acknowledged that Serrano could
not be held in contempt. Id. at 23. See supra notes 243-55 and accompanying text for discus-
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for as long as the reporter remained silent,"'8 but later declined to levy
additional fines .3
9
Another ominous event for journalists trying to go about their busi-
ness without government interference occurred last summer when a local
prosecutor scoured the telephone records of every phone user in south-
western Ohio in an attempt to identify a newspaper reporter's confiden-
tial sources. 390  Because information was not being sought from the
reporter, the inquiry was not prohibited by Ohio's shield law.391 Such an
investigation, which denies journalists and their employers the opportu-
nity to object in court, illustrates the technological limitations of a news-
gatherer's privilege.392
sions of similar court inquiries in the Farr and Rosato cases and supra note 324 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion regarding the effect of placing the shield law in the state constitution
on the Farr and Rosato holdings.
The judge ordered Serrano to answer the questions. Record at 90, Powell (No. BA
035498) (May 30, 1991). When Serrano refused, the judge imposed a $1500 sanction under
§ 177.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Id.; CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 177.5 (West
Supp. 1991). That section empowers a judicial officer, upon notice and an opportunity to be
heard, "to impose reasonable money sanctions, not to exceed fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500),
notwithstanding any other provision of law ... for any violation of a lawful court order by a
person done without good cause or substantial justification." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 177.5.
388. Record at 112-14, Powell (No. BA 035498) (May 30, 1991); Timnick, supra note 387,
at Al.
389. Record at 119, People v. Powell, No. BA 035498 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County, May
31, 1991); Lois Timnick, Judge Limits Fine Against Times Reporter, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 1991,
at Al. The judge relented after attorneys for Serrano and the Los Angeles Times argued that
he was prohibited from repeatedly sanctioning the same violation of his order. Record at 127,
Powell (No. BA 035498) (May 31, 1991); Brief of Los Angeles Times in Opposition to Re-
peated Imposition of Daily Fines at 4-12, People v. Powell, No. BA 035498 (Cal. Super. Ct.
L.A. County, May 31, 1991). Serrano, who remained silent, was ordered to pay the single
$1500 fine, however. Timnick, supra, at Al; Record at 119, 127, Powell (No. BA 035498)
(May 31, 1991).
390. Randall Rothenberg, Search for News Leak Spurs Ohio Phone Sweep, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 16, 1991, at A10. The Hamilton County, Ohio, prosecutor obtained a grand jury sub-
poena for the telephone records of every person in Area Code 513 who had called Wall Street
Journal reporter Alecia Swasy at her home or office in Pittsburgh between March 1, 1991, and
June 15, 1991. Id. The prosecutor was acting on a complaint by Procter & Gamble Co.,
which claimed that employees who contacted Swasy violated an Ohio statute making it a mis-
demeanor to disclose any confidential corporate matter or information without a company's
consent. Id. Procter & Gamble was angered by articles written by Swasy reporting that a
senior executive was under pressure to resign and the corporation was considering selling some
unprofitable divisions. Id. Cincinnati Bell complied with the subpoena after apparently
searching 655,297 phone numbers in an area covering 1156 square miles. Id. Swasy and the
Journal were not informed of the investigation. Id.
391. OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, 2739.12 (Anderson 1981).
392. News of the investigation prompted an immediate outcry from journalists and their
lawyers. See, e.g., Associated Press, Procter, Journal Are At Odds Over Suspected News Leaks,
CHI. TRIa., Aug. 13, 1991, Business section, at 3; Rita Ciolli & Dottie Enrico, P&G Tries to
Plug (News) Leak, NEWSDAY, Aug. 13, 1991, at 17; Pat Guy, Procter & Gamble Hunts In-
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VI. REDISCOVERING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. The Constitution and the Changing Role of the Press
In the increasing murkiness of post-Branzburg v. Hayes393 First
Amendment privilege jurisprudence,394 Delaney v. Superior Court 391 of-
fered the California Supreme Court an opportunity to recognize and pro-
tect the news media's crucial role in a complex society governed by a
secretive, omnipresent government. The tool was available: a clearly
written state constitutional provision,396 founded on the First Amend-
ment,397 which by its plain terms forbade inquiry into the newsgathering
process by parties lacking claims they were harmed by that process.
398
But the court used facts testing the outer limits of the privilege,399 both
under the state shield law and First Amendment doctrine, to eviscerate
the protection for working journalists.
The search and arrest of Sean Patrick Delaney presented an easy
case for forcing disclosure: two people employed by a newspaper witness
a public event, and their testimony could decide whether a person
charged with a crime would be punished or go free.4'  Because the testi-
mony did not go directly to the defendant's guilt or innocence, and be-
cause the only other witnesses harbored natural biases or were parties to
the case,4"' the facts gave the court the occasion to remove two signifi-
formant, USA TODAY, Aug. 13, 1991, at 1B; Since When Is NewsA Crime?, L.A. TIMEs, Aug.
17, 1991, at B15. First Amendment attorney Floyd Abrams characterized the investigation as
"an effort to circumvent [the Ohio shield] law, designed to permit journalists and sources to
talk freely." Guy, supra, at lB. Paul E. Steiger, the Journal's managing editor, blasted the
investigation as "an effort to intimidate [Procter & Gamble] employees from talking to report-
ers and to circumvent the protections that either shield laws or the First Amendment pro-
vide." Randall Rothenberg, Employee Phone Records Examined in Company's Search for
News Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1991, at A13.
393. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
394. See supra notes 117-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of qualified First
Amendment privilege.
395. 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990).
396. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b); Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 798, 789 P.2d at 941, 268 Cal. Rptr.
at 760.
397. See Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 276, 690 P.2d 625, 629, 208 Cal. Rptr.
152, 156 (1984) ("We cannot ignore or subordinate the First Amendment values furthered by
the protection of confidential sources and information."); Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89
Cal. App. 3d 388, 399, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608, 614 (1979) ("[Ihe statute under which petitioner
claims evinces a strong legislative policy in favor of giving the widest possible effect to the
privilege consistent with federal and state constitutional imperatives.").
398. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b); see supra notes 198-208 & 226-31 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 287-300 and accompanying text.
400. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 814, 789 P.2d at 952, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
401. In addition to Kopetman and Bertero, there were six witnesses: four police officers,
Delaney and Delaney's girlfriend. Opening Brief on the Merits for Real Parties in Interest at
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cant hurdles that had allowed many journalists to avoid the choice of
violating their professional ethics or going to jail. Henceforth, criminal
defendants need not show that they have exhausted alternative sources" 2
or that the information sought might exonerate them." 3 By ignoring the
teachings of the federal courts since Branzburg, in which society's inter-
ests in the unrestricted flow of information and an independent watchdog
press receive great weight,' the California Supreme Court cut the state
shield law from its moorings and violated the demands of the United
States Constitution."
First Amendment rights are not held by journalists as individuals,
but as surrogates" 6 for a public that increasingly depends on the news
7, Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990) (No.
S006866).
402. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 812-13, 789 P.2d at 950-51, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 769-70.
403. Id. at 809, 789 P.2d at 948, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
404. See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-2, at 789-91. See infra note 424 for Justice Powell's
discussion of society's interest in unrestricted information.
405. A striking aspect of the Delaney opinion is the California Supreme Court's failure to
even discuss First Amendment privilege; the court chose instead to restrict its analysis to art. I,
§ 2(b) of the state constitution, and its discussion of constitutional rights was limited to the
criminal defendant's right to a fair trial. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 805-09, 789 P.2d at 945-49,
268 Cal. Rptr. at 764-68. The court treated the shield law as if it displaced the protections
accorded journalists under the First Amendment, and dismissed Branzburg and its progeny
with a footnote:
There has been considerable debate as to whether the [United States Supreme
C]ourt as a whole in Branzburg v. Hayes. . .-recognized a qualified privilege.... In
Mitchell v. Superior Court,... we concurred in the observation by some other courts
that Justice Powell's position was the "minimum common denominator" of
Branzburg and that the decision therefore does not preclude a qualified privilege. We
did not decide the question of whether Branzburg requires a privilege in some cases.
Because Branzburg is not dispositive of the present case, we need not linger over the
troublesome question of its scope and meaning.
Id. at 795 n.3, 789 P.2d at 938 n.3, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 757 n.3 (emphasis in original).
Kopetman and Bertero did not ask the court to apply First Amendment privilege, choos-
ing instead to stress the broad protection afforded by the shield law. Interview with Rex S.
Heinke of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Counsel for Kopetman and Bertero (Mar. 5, 1991).
Nevertheless, by ignoring the First Amendment principles recognized in Branzburg and the
cases interpreting it, including its own Mitchell decision, the California Supreme Court under-
cut the protections accorded the press under the United States Constitution. See supra notes
92-134 and accompanying text.
406. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980); see also Branzburg,
408 U.S. at 721 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The press has a preferred position in our constitu-
tional scheme, not to enable it to make money, not to set newsmen apart as a favored class, but
to bring fulfillment to the public's right to know."); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspa-
per Co., 633 F.2d 583, 595 n.12 (1st Cir. 1980) (observing that First Amendment rights,
"while lodged in the reporter and his publisher, in reality reflect an underlying interest of the
public. ... 'The issue is the public's right to know. That right is the reporter's by virtue of the
proxy which the ... First Amendment gives to the press in behalf of the public.'" (quoting A.
BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 85 (1975))).
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media as its window to the world.' 7 The United States Supreme Court
has recognized "a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open,""
and that free discussion of government affairs is impermissibly inhibited
by state intrusion into the editorial process.' Even the hostile plurality
in Branzburg acknowledged that "without some protection for seeking
out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." a10 Moreover,
in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,4" the Court held that the
First Amendment safeguarded the newsgathering process, rather than
simply the right to publish.412
When it announced in United States v. Nixon 413 that "[tihe need [of
litigants] to develop all relevant facts ... is both fundamental and com-
prehensive,14 14 the Supreme Court limited compelled disclosure to the
rules of evidence. 15 Furthermore, the Court has declared off-limits
those persons who are protected by constitutional, common law and stat-
utory privileges.4 16
407. Professor Baker argues that recognizing an evidentiary privilege for journalists gives
them only a constitutionally mandated "defensive right." Baker, supra note 6, at 840. "The
checking function of the press clearly requires independence from government .... Defensive
protection ... is vital to protecting the press's capacity to expose government." Id. This
protection preserves institutional autonomy; it "would not give the press any special affirma-
tive privilege to act or to obtain information or resources. It merely would prohibit govern-
ment from requisitioning the products of the proper activities of the press." Id. at 850.
408. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
409. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
410. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681.
411. 448 U.S. 581 (1980).
412. Id. at 576. Justice Stevens observed:
This is a watershed case. Until today the Court has accorded virtually absolute
protection to the dissemination of information or ideas, but never before has it
squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitu-
tional protection whatsoever....
... Today, however, for the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an
arbitrary interference with access to important information is an abridgment of the
freedoms of speech and of the press protected by the First Amendment.
Id. at 582-83 (Stevens, J., concurring).
413. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
414. Id. at 709.
415. Id.
416. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331-32 (1950). In his concurring opinion in
Delaney, Justice Mosk noted:
The rights of confrontation and compulsory process under the Sixth Amend-
ment, and the more general right to a fair trial under the Fifth Amendment, are not
absolute. Rather, they are exercised in a framework of state law privileges, immuni-
ties, and rules of evidence that sometime block access to information needed by the
defendant. (See Chambers v. Mississippi [410 U.S. 284, 302-03 (1973), where the
United States Supreme Court, in striking down a hearsay rule on due process
grounds, announced that its holding does not "signal any diminution in the respect
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The Court has declared that the First Amendment bars government
from interfering in any way with a free press. 17 To limit the interference
that inevitably occurs when journalists are forced to testify or disclose
their work product, courts have recognized a newsgathering privilege
under the Constitution418 and common law.419 Such a privilege protects
the news media from retaliation and the appropriation of its work
product by an antagonistic government. 420 This protection can be over-
come only by a showing that the evidence sought is material, determina-
tive of the case, and unavailable elsewhere.42
If consistently applied, this qualified privilege provides a First
Amendment safety net that allows reporters to gather news with the as-
surance that the courts will not inquire into their activities unless there is
a clear and pressing need. The California Supreme Court rolled up that
net in Delaney, however.4 22 The threat of compelled disclosure whenever
a court decides there is a reasonable possibility that a journalist might
materially assist a criminal defendant provides no assurance to news
sources that a journalist's promise can ever be kept.423
The news media's service as representative and conduit of informa-
traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment and implementation of their
own criminal trial rules and procedures."]) While consistency has not been a hall-
mark in this area, courts have been extremely reluctant to make incursions into state
law testimonial privileges... on Sixth Amendment grounds.
Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 818-19, 789 P.2d at 955, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 774 (Mosk, J., concurring).
417. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974).
418. See Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d
778, 783 (2d Cir. 1972), cert denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 279, 690
P.2d 625, 631, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152, 158.
419. See Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 716 (3d Cir. 1979), where the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals grounded a qualified newsgathering privilege in common law and Rule 501
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which permits federal courts to recognize privileges "gov-
erned by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience." FED. R. EvID. 501. Courts relying on
federal common law draw on the same constitutional policies and use the same analysis as
those recognizing a privilege under the First Amendment, however. FRANKLIN & ANDER-
SON, supra note 91, at 601.
California courts recognizing a newsgathering privilege outside the shield law must rely
directly on the First Amendment because the California Evidence Code prohibits the creation
of privileges not enacted by statute. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 911 (West 1966); Mitchell, 37
Cal. 3d at 274 n.3, 690 P.2d at 628 n.3, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 155 n.3.
420. Baker, supra note 6, at 839.
421. See supra notes 117-34 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 327-76 and accompanying text.
423. See FRANKLIN & ANDERSON, supra note 91, at 598:
If the privilcge works because the source relies on it in deciding whether to disclose,
or because the reporter relies on it in deciding whether to promise confidentiality, it
will be effective only to the extent that it enables the decision-maker ... to predict in
advance whether the reporter can be ordered to disclose.
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tion for the citizenry must be considered in the analysis of any law that
affects newsgathering.424 Sources who are at risk and are aware of the
illusory nature of promises of confidentiality under California law are
unlikely to confide in reporters. 2 Unpredictable application of the
shield law therefore diminishes the flow of information to the public and
violates the First Amendment. 426 A state statute that unjustifiably inter-
424. As Justice Powell observed in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.:
An informed public depends on accurate and effective reporting by the news media.
No individual can obtain for himself the information needed for the intelligent dis-
charge of his political responsibilities. For most citizens the prospect of personal
familiarity with newsworthy events is hopelessly unrealistic. In seeking out the news
the press therefore acts as an agent of the public at large. It is the means by which
the people receive that free flow of information and ideas essential to intelligent self-
government. By enabling the phblic to assert meaningful control over the political
process, the press performs a crucial function in effecting the societal purpose of the
First Amendment.
417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
425. "[A]n unbridled subpoena power-the absence of a constitutional right protecting, in
any way, a confidential relationship from compulsory process-will either deter sources from
divulging information or deter reporters from gathering and publishing information."
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting); accord Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 279, 690
P.2d at 631, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 158 ("A confidential source... might well be deterred by the
threat that his identity and information might be made public.").
426. As Justice Mosk observed in Delaney, a test that balances the interests of criminal
defendants and journalists, as espoused by the Delaney majority, runs counter to the dictates of
the federal and state constitutions because all information outside the boundaries of that neces-
sary to give the defendant a fair trial is protected by the shield law. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 818,
789 P.2d at 955, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 774 (Mosk, J., concurring). Justice Mosk advocated a two-
part test in which a criminal defendant seeking evidence from a journalist must show (1) there
is a reasonable possibility the evidence will materially assist the defense; and (2) there are no
alternative sources for the evidence. Id., 789 P.2d at 954, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 774 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
The alternative-source rule is a pragmatic way to reconcile the defendant's rights and
those of the press. Justice Mosk reasoned:
When full disclosure can be accomplished without interfering with the reporter's
privilege, the defendant will be able to receive as fair a trial as the state can ensure,
without having to resort to a breach of the reporter's privilege.
[T]he alternative-source rule remains focused on a single decisive question: does the
defendant need the information to obtain a fair trial? The alternative-source rule also
incorporates a functional approach to the defendant's fair trial rights, based on the
recognition that these rights exist within a framework of state law privileges and
immunities. What one commentator stated of the communications privilege applies
at least equally to the reporter's immunity: "A communications privilege would be
of little value if a [criminal] defendant could override it whenever its invocation con-
cealed evidence of some probative value. Courts must respect the legislative judg-
ment that in some situations the social policy underlying a privilege should require
that litigants be denied access to otherwise admissible evidence. .. ."
Id. at 819-20, 789 P.2d at 956, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 775 (Mosk, J., concurring) (quoting Robert
Weisberg, Note, Defendant v. Witness: Measuring Confrontation and Compulsory Process
Rights Against Statutory Communications Privileges, 30 STAN. L. REv. 935, 966 (1978)).
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feres with First Amendment freedoms427 or with the "public scrutiny
and discussion of governmental affairs which the First Amendment was
adopted to protect""42 cannot pass constitutional muster.
Delaney's outcome was a natural result of the California Supreme
Court's decision to ignore the shield law's First Amendment founda-
tions.42 9 While promises of confidentiality are important to newsgather-
ing, the emphasis is better placed on the preservation of press
autonomy.a30 If the constitutional principle of freely flowing informa-
tion-often requiring the use of anonymous sources-is emphasized, a
testimonial privilege logically is limited to information gained under a
promise of confidentiality.431 However, by compelling newsgatherers to
testify and disclose work materials, the courts also intrude into the con-
stitutionally protected editorial process,432 transforming journalists into
inexpensive tools for the government and private litigants pursuing their
own interests in an adversarial setting.433 Such an approach com-
promises the independence of the press.
Futhermore, the judicial erosion of the California shield law ignores
the changing role of the news media and runs counter to the public will.
The Branzburg plurality disputed the value of agreements by reporters
that concealed from grand juries the criminal conduct of news sources.434
Today, however, confidentiality agreements are used primarily to gain
information from government employees, not wrongdoers seeking to hide
427. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969).
428. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978).
429. See supra note 405.
430. See O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 523 N.E.2d 277, 279 (N.Y. 1988). The New
York Court of Appeals observed that press autonomy would be threatened by litigants who
used the newsgathering resources of the press for their private purposes. Id. "The practical
burden on time and resources as well as the consequent diversion of journalistic effort and
disruption of newsgathering activity, would be particularly inimical to the vigor of a free
press." Id.
431. See United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1181 (1st Cir. 1988):
When there is no confidential source or information at stake, the identification
of First Amendment interests is a more elusive task.... We have been referred to no
authoritative sources demonstrating or explaining how any chilling effect could result
from the disclosure of statements made for publication without any expectation of
confidentiality.
Id.
432. United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1126 (1981).
433. See Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 821, 789 P.2d at 957, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 776 (Mosk, J.,
concurring); see also Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 1975) ("The
compelled production of a reporter's resource materials is equally as invidious as the com-
pelled disclosure of his confidential informants.").
434. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 692-93.
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criminal conduct behind the journalist's privilege. 435 Rather than coop-
erating with government, which frequently desires to hide the truth,
journalists have an obligation to seek truth independent of, and often in
conflict with, government.436
Acknowledging this watchdog role, the United States Supreme
Court has held that a free press cannot be required to rely solely on the
government's willingness to supply it with information.4 37  Neither
should the press be required to rely on the sufferance of government and
the courts in gathering information and making editorial judgments re-
garding what should, and should not, be published. 438 The Court has
also declared that journalists cannot be punished for publishing truthful,
legally obtained information unless the government demonstrates that
the sanction is "overwhelmingly necessary"4 39 to advance an interest of
the "highest order."'  Therefore, only under the rarest, most compel-
ling of circumstances should a newsgatherer be forced to sacrifice his or
435. Langley & Levine, supra note 135, at 25-26.
436. Journalism's break with government is well illustrated by the decision of The New
York Times to publish the Pentagon Papers, described at supra note 48. See HARRISON E.
SALISBURY, WrrHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR 14, 30, 34 (1980). In publishing the "top secret"
report, the preeminent newspaper made clear that it "no longer was handmaiden, supporter,
crony, adherent, bondsman, counselor or confidant to 'government' but was itself an independ-
ent power with independent rights, independent judgment and an independent responsibility."
Id. at 14.
In Branzburg, Justice Stewart emphasized the increasing necessity for an independent
press "[als private and public aggregations of power burgeon in size and the pressures for
conformity necessarily mount." 408 U.S. at 727 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Harrison Salisbury,
longtime editor and correspondent for The New York Times, similarly emphasized this critical
role of the news media:
The role of the press ha[s] been redefined by Watergate, by the Pentagon Papers,
by [New York Times Co. v. Sullivan], by the new but scarcely tested function of the
nation's journalists as surrogates of the public in monitoring the new hippopotami
which now strewed the landscape-the bureaucracies which had burgeoned beyond
human imagination, the imperial presidency, the military-industrial complex, the in-
telligence community, the welfare state, the supra-national corporations, the aggre-
gates of power, vested influence and pervasive authority in whose presence the
ordinary citizen [is] little more than an intelligent pygmy.
SALISBURY, supra, at 447.
437. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979).
438. See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258. The Supreme Court held:
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limita-
tions on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public
officials-whether fair or unfair--constitute the exercise of editorial control and
judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial
process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press
as they have evolved to this time.
Id.
439. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 537 (1988).
440. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103. The Supreme Court repeatedly has expressed concern
that punishment will cause media "timidity and self-censorship" contrary to First Amendment
November 1991] ILL USOR Y NEWSGA THERER'S PRIVILEGE
her constitutionally protected independence on the altar of an adversarial
judicial system.
The public considers newsgatherers to be highly professional, and
not abusers of their rights." The public attributes the failings of the
news media to external factors, including pressure from special interests
and interference by government, rather than journalists' biases or inade-
quate skills."' It is through the use of confidential sources, which the
public approves," 3 that journalists can function with independence.
4"
In California, the public's desire for an independent press free from judi-
cial intrusion was demonstrated in the overwhelming vote for Proposi-
tion 5, which placed the newsgatherer's shield law in the state
constitution.445
In sum, compelled disclosure of sources and unpublished informa-
tion undercuts journalists' autonomy, by making them private investiga-
tors for litigants, 44 and their effectiveness in gathering news, by making
interests. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 535-36; Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,496
(1975).
441. THE TIMES MIRROR Co., supra note 46, at 10. A Gallup Organization poll found that
seven out of every 10 Americans consider journalists "highly professional." Id. at 26. Nine
out of 10 express a favorable opinion of the nation's press. Id. at 23.
442. Id. at 31-33.
443. Id. at 36. Almost eight in 10 people feel that "sometimes a reporter should be allowed
to keep his source confidential if that is the only way he can get his information." Id. Other
studies have found that the public gives high credibility ratings to unnamed sources, and that
news consumers perceive a controversial story to be more accurate and fair when no source or
an unnamed source is quoted than if the story quotes a named source or two opposing named
sources. K. Tim Wulfemeyer, How and W1hy Anonymous Attribution is Used by Time and
Newsweek, 62 JOuRNALISM Q. 81, 82 (1985).
444. THE TIMES MIRROR Co., supra note 46, at 33. "The public, apparently, sees the sins
of the press mostly as the result of external forces-audience, interest groups, government and
advertisers (63 percent)-rather than internal factors-personal bias, newspeople's back-
grounds and budgets for news operations. In other words, poor performance is a consequence
of dependence." Id.
445. Playboy Enters. v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 27, 201 Cal. Rptr. 207, 217-18
(1984); see supra notes 164-74 and accompanying text.
446. Monk, supra note 50, at 15; see supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. The Re-
porters Committee for Freedom of the Press contends that "[s]ome litigants are simply lazy. It
is often simpler and cheaper to compel journalists to reveal their sources than to conduct
investigations to find witnesses and then to subpoena those witnesses to testify." CONFIDEN-
TIAL SOURCES, supra note 9, at 2. Many journalists complain that the information sought
from them is often cumulative and its value is frequently overestimated. Blasi, supra note 48,
at 261-62. An extreme example occurred when a plaintiff who claimed injuries suffered at a
music festival attended by 85,000 people subpoenaed a Chicago Tribune reporter to testify
about the crowded conditions. Bousquet v. City of Chicago, NEws MEDIA & THE LAW,
June-July 1982, at 36 (Cir. Ct. Cook County). The trial judge quashed the subpoena. Id.
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them untrustworthy.' 7 In destroying the ability of reporters to make
reliable promises, the courts impermissibly interfere with the news me-
dia's service as a "powerful antidote" to the abuse of government
power." Compelled disclosure certainly runs counter to the great re-
spect the United States Supreme Court has accorded the press as "'the
handmaiden of effective judicial administration.' "44
B. Practical Proposals: Ethical Housecleaning and a New Shield
Faced with judicial insensitivity.. 0 to the challenges they face col-
lecting information on the public's behalf,451 how are working journalists
to respond? When confronted with a subpoena, those who hold high
their ethics and what they perceive to be their duty under the United
States Constitution must choose between breaking their moral code or
breaking the law.452
Neither the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
45 3
447. KLAIDMAN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 54, at 163; Blasi, supra note 48, at 266; see
Monk, supra note 50, at 53.
448. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966), where the Supreme Court observed:
The Constitution specifically selected the press... to play an important role in the
discussion of public affairs. Thus the press serves and was designed to serve as a
powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitu-
tionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the
people whom they were selected to serve.
Id.
449. Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 839 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333, 350 (1966)):
A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration .... Its function in this regard is documented by an impressive record
of service over several centuries. The press does not simply publish information
about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police,
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Id.
450. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
451. Professors Gillmor and Barron have colorfully described the situation as "guerilla
warfare" between government and the news media. DONALD M. GILLMOR & JEROME A.
BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 485 (2d ed. 1974). Indicative of some journalists'
feelings about the courts are the comments of Sidney Zion:
The question now before the house is whether the news media, having been gouged,
kneed, thumbed and finally pummeled to the canvas by the United States Supreme
Court, will at least recognize that they are in a fight to the finish with a passel of
judicial thugs who intend to keep them cowering in the corner.
Sidney Zion, How the Supreme Court Zaps the Press, NEW YORK, June 19, 1978, at 10-11,
quoted in RIVERS ET AL., supra note 7, at 56.
452. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 732 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see RIVERS ET AL., supra note 7,
at 201-02.
453. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690.
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nor article I, section 2(b) of the California Constitution454 offers journal-
ists absolute protection. The courts disagree as to whether qualified First
Amendment newsgathering privilege exists, and if so, when it applies and
what factors are to be weighed.455 This debate has caused confusion
among journalists4 5 6 and has made it difficult to draft professional guide-
lines that comply with the law.4 57 It is nigh impossible for a journalist
and source making a pact of confidentiality to know whether a subpoena
will be forthcoming.4ss
The problem is particularly acute in California, where different rules
now apply in defamation suits,459 in civil litigation in which the journalist
is not a party,' in criminal cases in which the subpoena is issued by the
defendant, 4 1 and in criminal cases in which the subpoena is issued by the
prosecution.462 When courts seek to balance a litigant's interest against
that of a journalist, the results are unpredictable." 3 This inevitably chills
454. Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 805, 789 P.2d 934, 946, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753,
765 (1990).
455. See John E. Osborn, The Reporter's Confidentiality Privilege: Updating the Empirical
Evidence After a Decade of Subpoenas, 58 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 57, 61 (1985) ("T]he
case law in the aftermath of Branzburg has thus far failed to provide clear and consistent
guidelines for editors and reporters forced to choose between disclosure and possible
incarceration.").
456. Achal Mehra, Newsmen's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 59 JOURNALISM Q. 560, 560
(1982).
457. See id. at 561.
458. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 731 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
459. See Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 690 P.2d 625, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152
(1984); supra notes 191-208 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 117-34 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of qualified First Amendment privilege.
460. See New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 453, 796 P.2d 811, 273 Cal.
Rptr. 98 (1990). See also supra notes 209-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of abso-
lute immunity under the California shield law.
461. See Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1990). See also supra
notes 327-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of qualified immunity under the Califor-
nia shield law.
462. The California Supreme Court limited its discussion in Delaney to the competing
rights of a criminal defendant and journalists, and did not address the issue of whether a
prosecution subpoena should cause a court to similarly engage in a balancing test. Delaney, 50
Cal. 3d at 816 n.34, 789 P.2d at 954 n.34, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 773 n.34. Arguably, the shield's
absolute language would protect a journalist from a prosecutor's subpoena because ihe prose-
cution holds no constitutional right to a fair trial. See Zicarelli v. Deitz, 633 F.2d 312, 329 (3d
Cir. 1980) (Gibbons, J., dissenting). However, the Delaney court implied that the shield law
might become qualified if a prosecutor can offer "a constitutional interest sufficient to require
the disclosure of information otherwise protected by the shield law." Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at
816 n.34, 789 P.2d at 954 n.34, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 773 n.34.
463. Recent use of punitive measures other than contempt, in order to avoid the shield law's
protection of nonparty journalists, are likely to further complicate the issue. See supra notes
377-92 and accompanying text.
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the flow of information. 4 As one court observed, "unless the declarant
has faith that the recipient will preserve the confidence, he will not be-
stow it."
4 65
Nevertheless, promises of confidentiality permeate the process of
gathering and disseminating news. 466 Given the very limited circum-
stances in which a journalist can guarantee that a promise lawfully can
be kept-civil actions in which the reporter is not a party, in states with
absolute statutory privileges467-- these agreements must involve naive
sources. Journalists who make promises must be similarly unin-
formed." 8 If they are aware of the legal risks, they must be consciously
playing Russian roulette with the possiblity of going to jail469 or inten-
tionally misleading their sources with promises they have no intention of
keeping.
Whatever one's conclusions about the motivations of promise-
making journalists, agreements of confidentiality are being made indis-
criminately and without adequate internal controls.470 This in turn un-
464. Osborn, supra note 455, at 75. While this effect is logical, it cannot be proven empiri-
cally. As one newspaper editor observed: "The most chilling aspect of the spectre of disclo-
sure is that you are not always sure it's happening.... The real loss is the source who never
calls, the tips and stories that go unnoticed because the originator of the lead got scared off."
Id.
465. United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 355-56 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1113 (1981).
466. One study determined that 33% of newspaper stories include quotes from unnamed
sources. Hugh M. Culbertson, Veiled Attribution-An Element of Style?, 55 JOURNALISM Q.
456, 465 (1978). Another study found that 55% of network news reports relied on anonymous
sources. K. Tim Wulfemeyer & Lori L. McFadden, Anonymous Attribution in Network News,
63 JOURNALISM Q. 468, 471 (1986). In Time and Newsweek newsmagazines, 80% of the
stories contained anonymous attribution, despite a Newsweek policy that discouraged the prac-
tice and admonished staff members that the use of unnamed sources hurt the magazine's credi-
bility. Wulfemeyer, supra note 443, at 85-86.
467. There can be no dispute that the First Amendment, post-Branzburg, provides at most
a qualified privilege that can be overcome. See supra notes 92-134 and accompanying text.
Even if Branzburg is limited to the criminal context, Herbert v. Lando makes clear that a claim
of privilege by a defamation defendant must yield to the plaintiff's demand for evidence neces-
sary to prove a critical element of the cause of action. 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979). While
Branzburg allows the states to enact shield laws, a generalized assertion of privilege must yield
to a criminal defendant's constitutionally protected right to the production of relevant, specific
and necessary evidence. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974). State statutes
facially offering absolute protection to newsgatherers who withhold evidence can therefore
provide unqualified privilege only in civil litigation in which the journalist is not a defendant.
468. Professor Blasi found in his 1971 survey that journalists' ignorance about shield laws
was "remarkable." Blasi, supra note 48, at 275.
469. See id. at 276-77. "Reporters admitted.., that their promises to sources to go to jail if
necessary to protect confidences are premised on the firm belief that it will never come to that
and that, even if it did, the sentence would be minimal." Id. at 277.
470. See supra notes 52-56 & 58 and accompanying text.
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dermines the legitimate use of unnamed sources47 1 and justifies judicial
skepticism.472 In fact, it was the broad scope of the shield law, protecting
both confidential and nonconfidential sources and information, that
caused the Delaney court to include confidentiality as a factor in its bal-
ancing test.473 The news media cannot expect the courts to recognize an
evidentiary privilege that is too sweeping and easily abused.474
If promises of confidentiality are crucial to newsgathering, the jour-
nalism profession must persuade the courts that protection of these
promises is deserved.475 Journalists should draft a uniform ethical stan-
dard476 limiting the circumstances under which agreements of confidenti-
ality may be made, and defining under what circumstances these
agreements end. Because of the direct threat to the flow of information,
the policies supporting a First Amendment privilege most persuasively
apply to situations in which important information would be withheld by
sources who fear exposure absent a commitment of secrecy.477 Under
this reasoning, the need for a privilege478 diminishes where there is no
promise of confidentiality,479 or if the need for continued confidentiality
has ended.480
471. Wulfemeyer & McFadden, supra note 466, at 468, 473.
472. For example, in Bruno & Stillman v. Globe Newspaper Co., the First Circuit was trou-
bled by a reporter's informal and often unilateral method of categorizing information as "con-
fidential" or "nonconfidential." 633 F.2d 583, 594 (1st Cir. 1980). In such situations, the
court observed, a judge "must assess the extent to which there is a need for confidentiality.
Not all information as to sources is equally deserving of confidentiality... [Promises can]
range from the cavalierly volunteered to the carefully bargained-for undertaking." Id. at 597
(emphasis added).
473. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 810, 789 P.2d at 949, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
474. See STRENTZ, supra note 84, at 100.
475. The creation of an evidentiary privilege is improper unless it "promotes sufficiently
important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence." Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
476. The need for consistency has been long recognized by the news media. See Blasi, supra
note 48, at 258. Professor Monk has argued that eliminating a newsgatherer's privilege would
penalize "thorough, probing" journalists, but internal ethical standards would "drastically re-
duce the inappropriate use of confidential sources" without hampering conscientious reporters
using confidential sources to collect important information. Monk, supra note 50, at 8-9.
477. Criden, 633 F.2d at 360-61 (Rambo, J., concurring).
478. See id. at 356 ("The rule follows where its reason leads; where the reason stops, there
stops the rule."). This precept was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in the context
of a qualified privilege protecting the identities of government informers: "[O]nce the identity
of the informer has been disclosed to those who would have cause to resent the communica-
tion, the privilege is no longer applicable." Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61
(1957).
479. See United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1181 (1st Cir. 1988) ("[N]o
authoritative sources demonstrat[e] or explain[ ] how any chilling effect could result from the
disclosure of statements made for publication without any expectation of confidentiality.").
480. See Criden, 633 F.2d at 360-61 (Rambo, J., concurring).
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The great variety of state shield laws and the absence of a federal
statutory privilege have caused the nation's courts to craft an assortment
of bewildering and unpredictable balancing tests. Journalists should
adopt an ethical code responsive to the needs of libel plaintiffs and crimi-
nal defendants for information. They then should draft a uniform statute
or constitutional provision that offers absolute protection for information
gained under a promise of confidentiality.4"' If confidential information
is sought in a defamation action in which the plaintiff must prove actual
malice,48 2 or by a defendant in a criminal action,48 3 the privilege would
become qualified. In such cases, a court could order disclosure only after
the party seeking the information makes a clear and specific showing that
the evidence is (1) highly material and relevant, (2) crucial to the party's
claim, and (3) not available from an alternative source.48 4
Likewise, the First Amendment interest in protecting press auton-
omy justifies qualified privilege for work product and other information
not gained under a promise of confidentiality. The same three factors
would veil newsgathering materials and internal decision-making
processes of news organizations in all but the most pressing circum-
stances.48 5 Such a rule would protect the exchange of information under
circumstances that are not expressly confidential, but under which the
journalist feels ethically compelled to withhold to protect sensitive rela-
tionships with sources.48 6 At the same time, creating a qualified privilege
would relieve journalists of the perceived, but unnecessary, duty to pro-
tect all unpublished information, even in the most innocuous circum-
stances.48 7 While existing professional codes of ethics forbid the
481. The constitutional provision should not be limited to proceedings in which the journal-
ist is threatened with contempt because the courts would be left to formulate a balancing test
for defamation actions, as the California Supreme Court did in Mitchell, possibly resulting in
inconsistent rules. See Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 279, 690 P.2d at 632, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
Litigants and courts also would continue to seek ways to impose other punitive measures that
fall outside the contempt power. See supra notes 377-92 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of recent such attempts.
The shield law should remain in the California Constitution to avoid the inherent weak-
nesses of a statute, such as those identified by courts before 1980. See supra notes 243-57 and
accompanying text for discussions of the Farr and Rosato cases. As a constitutional provision,
the privilege would have to yield only to a competing state or federal constitutional right. See
New York Times Co., 51 Cal. 3d at 461-62, 796 P.2d at 816, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
482. See supra notes 63 & 123 and accompanying text.
483. See supra notes 334-42 and accompanying text.
484. This three-prong test, rooted in qualified First Amendment privilege, has been incor-
porated into some state shield laws. See, eg., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney
Supp. 1991).
485. See, eg., id.
486. See supra notes 354-55 and accompanying text.
487. Even though the California Supreme Court adopted a too-easily overcome balancing
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violation of promises of confidentiality, they do not require journalists to
defy the courts and reject their duty as citizens simply because the infor-
mation in their possession comes within the scope of an expansive shield
law such as article I, section 2(b) of the California Constitution.48
C. Newsgathering Under Current Law
Absent statutory change, California journalists may choose to assert
the qualified First Amendment privilege recognized in the federal
courts, 489 rather than the post-Delaney v. Superior Court 490 shield law.491
At first glance, First Amendment privilege appears to offer journalists
greater protection: it allows them to withhold information absent a
showing that it goes to the heart of the litigant's claim and is unavailable
from other sources. In recognizing such a privilege independent of the
shield law,492 the California Supreme Court appeared to limit the protec-
tion to civil proceedings and confidential sources and information, how-
ever.493 Similarly, while a majority of federal circuits recognize the
privilege, the courts disagree as to whether it applies to criminal subpoe-
nas and nonconfidential information.494 The situation is particularly un-
clear in the Ninth Circuit.495
test in Delaney, its observations about the relative merit of the Los Angeles Times journalists'
absolutist position are instructive:
Delaney's personal liberty is at stake. The reporters are not being asked to breach a
confidence or to disclose sensitive information that would in sny way even remotely
restrict their news-gathering ability. All that is being required of them is to accept
the civic responsibility imposed on all persons who witness alleged criminal conduct.
Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 816, 789 P.2d at 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
488. See supra notes 301-26 and accompanying text.
489. See supra notes 117-34 and accompanying text.
490. 50 Cal. 3d 785, 811, 789 P.2d 934, 950, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753, 769 (1990).
491. The availability of this federal constitutional protection even in proceedings falling
within the scope of the shield law was noted by Justice Mosk in New York Times Co. v.
Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 453, 469, 796 P.2d 811, 821, 273 Cal. Rptr. 98, 108 (1990) (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
492. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 690 P.2d 625, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1984).
493. Id. at 279, 690 P.2d at 632, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
494. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
495. "The Ninth Circuit has generally compelled testimony by reporters but has given some
recognition to a balancing test." Goodale & Moodhe, supra note 13, at 650. The circuit court
rejected a claim of privilege in the face of a grand jury subpoena. Lewis v. United States, 517
F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1975). It also denied a habeas corpus petition by Bill Farr, who refused
to cooperate with a court inquiry, see supra notes 246-50 and accompanying text, after engag-
ing in a vague balancing test weighing "the claimed First Amendment privilege and the oppos-
ing need for disclosure.., in light of the surrounding facts." Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464,
468 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). The Farr court did not explicitly rely on
any of the three factors used in other circuits. See id. at 469.
District courts in the Ninth Circuit have regularly employed the three-prong test (materi-
ality, crucial to the claim, and no alternative sources), but the results have not been favorable
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Reporters, editors, publishers and broadcasters should recognize the
limited protection offered by current state and federal law and the result-
ing unreliability of their promises of confidentiality.49 6 The ideal, of
course, is full disclosure of sources in the normal course of reporting the
news, and exceptions should be rare.49 7 With each confidentiality agree-
ment a journalist makes, he or she should evaluate whether the informa-
tion gained is worth a stint in jail.498 A promise of confidentiality is a
sacred trust499 that simultaneously puts the source at risk"c° and poten-
tially commits the journalist to subordinate his duties as a law-abiding
citizen to his role as an ethical newsgatherer. 50°
The decision is a moral one, rather than a legal one. Even if a jour-
nalist is permitted by the courts to withhold information, the decision to
retain evidence that could alter the outcome of litigation is one he or she
must live with for years to come.5 02 Alone, the ability to lawfully with-
for journalists. See Dillon v. City of San Francisco, 748 F. Supp. 722, 726-27 (N.D. Cal. 1990)
(holding that television cameraman must testify in civil suit about eyewitness observations);
Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., 109 F.R.D. 522, 527 (D. Nev. 1985) (holding that
under First Amendment, defendant journalists must identify confidential sources in libel suit,
but Nevada shield law bars disclosure); Laxalt v. McClatchy, 622 F. Supp. 737, 749 (D. Nev.
1985) (holding that newspaper reporters must identify confidential sources in libel suit);
DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 507 F. Supp. 880, 886 (D. Haw. 1981) (same). But see Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 89 F.R.D. 489, 494 (CD. Cal.
1981) (holding that nonparty newspaper reporters could not be compelled to disclose confiden-
tial information in civil suit because it was not crucial to claim and alternative sources were
not exhausted; reporters also protected under California shield law).
496. GILLMOR ET AL., supra note 78, at 393-94. "Reporters who assume that their
promises of confidentiality are protected by the First Amendment or by statute are taking a
great risk." Id. at 393.
497. RIvERs ET AL., supra note 7, at 200.
498. See EDMUND B. LAMBETH, COMMITTED JOURNALISM: AN ETHIC FOR THE PROFES-
SION 144 (1986).
499. Foreman, supra note 50, at 216.
500. Id.
501. See KLAIDMAN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 54, at 10-11. One commentator has urged
journalists to develop a professional standard for when a newsgatherer should place ethical
standards above the law. See James M. Fischer, Confidentiality and the Press: Tales of the
Confessional, 55 CAL. ST. B.J. 26, 29 (1980). The news media lose court battles and public
support by seeking "the widest possible scope of protection, whether or not its legitimate inter-
ests are affected by disclosure." Id. Therefore, journalists should avoid confrontations over
subpoenas and assert a privilege only when the reasons for the privilege are "directly at stake."
Id.
502. See KLAIDMAN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 54, at 11, 163-73 for a discussion of the
moral balancing required in making and keeping confidentiality agreements. According to the
authors, "[b]oth the objectives of journalism and the public interest will be served ifjournalists
learn to weigh and balance competing moral considerations in their work, rather than leaving
such balancing to the courts or leaving it aside completely as if it were a purely legal matter."
Id. at 11.
Under this view, any promise of confidentiality must be conditional, leaving journalists a
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hold information does not justify glib promises of confidentiality50 3 in
order to gain tangential information5 4 or beat the competition to the
story.505 Rather, a promise of confidentiality should be a last resort,
made to protect a source in physical or economic jeopardy and necessary
to collect information vital to a story that helps readers or listeners make
decisions about government or their community. 6 When the promise is
made, the reporter must inform the source (1) that courts often abrogate
such agreements and (2) whether the reporter50 7 intends to obey50 8 or
defy any court order requiring disclosure.
Legislative or judicial moves to create and enforce an absolute privi-
lege or a consistently interpreted and enforced qualified privilege are un-
likely. Without them, journalists should act responsibly to limit
confidentiality agreements to the most pressing circumstances. Doing so
may increase the prospects that a court will respect a reporter's promise
in the face of conflicting rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although abused through overuse, promises of confidentiality are
necessary for effective newsgathering by journalists fulfilling their role as
watchdogs over the powerful in American society. Absent a compelling
need for the information, courts should respect journalists' necessary
confidential relationships. Failure to do so infringes on the First Amend-
moral escape hatch that allows them to break the agreements when they believe it is appropri-
ate, such as when a source misleads the reporter. Id. at 166. A reporter must inform sources
of "the rules of the game .... All a reporter can guarantee is that a promise of confidentiality
will be broken only for morally overriding reasons that are extraordinarily compelling....
Even if a few sources evaporate, journalism as we know it will survive." Id. at 165.
503. See GILLMOR ET AL., supra note 78, at 394; KLAIDMAN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note
54, at 11.
504. See Foreman, supra note 50, at 218.
505. See LAMBETH, supra note 498, at 109-10.
506. Foreman, supra note 50, at 217-19; see STRENTz, supra note 84, at 98, 104. Before
agreeing to keep a source confidential, a reporter must always ask, "Is the news source seeking
anonymity to avoid retribution or to avoid responsibility? Is the information of such a crucial
nature to the story and to the news audience that the reporter would be irresponsible not to
provide anonymity?" STRENTZ, supra note 84, at 98 (emphasis in original).
507. Some news organizations consider a promise of confidentiality as belonging to the or-
ganization, and it is therefore the organization's decision whether to retain or disclose the
confidence. Cunningham, supra note 58, at 6. This deprives the employee journalist of the
ability to independently make and keep moral commitments. Id. at 7-8.
508. Such a promise of "conditional confidentiality" is proposed in LAMBETH, supra note
498, at 142-43. See also supra note 57 for a description of one newspaper's policy of obeying
court orders to disclose "anonymous" sources, while refusing to disclose "confidential"
sources under any circumstances.
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ment by reducing the free flow of information and compromising the in-
dependence of the press.
An inconsistently applied qualified privilege subverts the very pur-
pose of the privilege, for sources' doubts about the protection discourages
the making of promises of confidentiality and, in turn, chills information-
gathering by the news media. The more easily overcome the privilege,
the greater the violation of the First Amendment. In contrast, recogni-
tion of an absolute privilege gives journalists, as surrogates for the public,
the ability to carry out their First Amendment obligations to scrutinize
government and other centers of societal power and provide a forum for
informed debate on public issues.
Delaney v. Superior Court 5o grafted onto an otherwise absolute im-
munity from contempt a balancing test easily passed by criminal defend-
ants. The decision runs counter to First Amendment principles,
constitutional jurisprudence, and the will of the people. Likewise, the
immunity's availability only in contempt proceedings has caused courts
to employ a different balancing test or deny protection altogether when
journalists face other sanctions. A state constitutional privilege that is
available in all procedural situations must be enacted in order to elimi-
nate the guesswork of multiple tests with unpredictable results.
The journalism profession must justify such protection, however, by
limiting promises of confidentiality to situations of necessity and by dis-
closing nonconfidential information when it is crucial to a litigant's claim
and unavailable elsewhere. By undertaking a moral analysis when the
promises are made, and not just when they must be kept, journalists will
enter into fewer confidential relationships-but they will be relationships
courts are more likely to respect.
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